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A company is an integral part of society whose existence impacts the country’s 
economy and community as a whole, thus, the previous global financial crisis has 
highlighted the need for countries to have effective mechanisms to support and 
encourage corporate rescue. This is important because companies that encounter 
financial or economic collapse are able to benefit from corporate rescue mechanisms 
which may help preserve their on-going viability. In this regard, the turnaround of 
such companies will enable restoration of production capacity, employment, and the 
promotion of sustainability of capital and investments. However, existing legal 
frameworks on corporate rescue in many countries have been found to be wanting, 
and this has in turn triggered a new wave of legislative reform proposals. 
Thus, the aim of this dissertation is to interrogate into the issue of whether there is a 
need for Botswana to reform its insolvency laws in order to accommodate a 
modernised corporate rescue regime. This dissertation probes on the shortcomings of 
judicial management as a corporate rescue regime which is currently operative in 
Botswana. Furthermore, the study reveals the performance of judicial management as 
a regime in other countries in order to illustrate its inherent weaknesses. 
This study makes a comparison of the main components that make up modern 
corporate rescue regimes in order to be able to identify critical issues to be 
considered in making recommendations for legislative reform. Overall the study 
recommends the reform of the judicial management laws in Botswana by integrating 
the positive aspects of corporate rescue as applied in other countries as illustrated by 
examples of Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa, and avoiding the 
pitfalls so far proving a burden in these jurisdictions. The reform should also make 
adjustments accordingly as relevant to the existing business environment and the 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background Information 
Many countries now have corporate rescue or restructuring laws that seek to preserve 
the going concern value of ailing enterprises; 1 this is because a company is an 
integral part of a countries economy whose success is highly beneficial to society. In 
this light, McCormack notes that corporate rescue laws are not only there to 
maximise returns to creditors, but also to help secure other objectives such as 
preserving employment, encouraging the creation and development of an 
entrepreneurial class of business people and facilitating national strategic objectives 
such as maintaining choice for the consumer and keeping alive corporate champions 
that might otherwise fall victim to foreign competition.2  The concern for the 
wellbeing of those dependent upon an enterprise which may well be the lifeblood of 
a region is also a legitimate factor that a modern law of insolvency should seek to 
uphold. 
      Moreover, one cannot overlook the distinct possibility that the reason why first 
world countries flourish may be due to the progressive attitude adopted by these 
countries towards assisting enterprises that encounter difficulties that can be 
overcome.3 With this in mind, one would advocate for countries, especially 
developing ones like Botswana, to keep abreast of modernised corporate rescue laws. 
1.1.1 Corporate Rescue 
Corporate rescue is a term used to refer to an outcome by which the business of an 
insolvent or near insolvent company avoids closure and can continue trading as a 
going concern, after having been through a formal or informal rescue procedure.4 
Firstly, such rescue may be conducted by way of the continuation of the company as 
an entity, for example, through reorganisation, financial restructuring, refinancing, 
                                                          
1 G McCormack ‘Corporate rescue law in Singapore and the appropriateness of chapter 11 of the US 
bankruptcy code as a model’ (2008) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 396. 
2 Ibid at 401. 
3 R Bradstreet ‘New Business Rescue: will creditors sink or swim ‘(2011) 128 SALJ 352 at 355, 
Bradstreet cites Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd (2000)(2)SA 27 (c ) para 55 in this regard 
4 A John ‘Corporate insolvency in the United Kingdom: The impact of the Enterprise Act 2002’ 




debt composition or rescheduling.5 Additionally, the company’s undertaking may be 
rescued by its continuation under new ownership and management liberated from the 
company’s debts.  In this regard, Frisby makes a distinction between ‘rescuing the 
company’ and ‘rescuing the business’ of the company in the following words: 
‘Rescuing the company, which might be described as pure rescue, would involve the   
corporate entity emerging from the rehabilitation endeavour intact, so as to continue 
substantially  the same operations , with the same workforce and in the ownership of  
the same people. The critical point is that the entity itself remains functional. 
However, rescuing the business is perhaps most accurately expressed as a form of 
corporate recycling. The company’s business, or a viable part of that business, is 
sold as a going concern to a third party. This means that the productive part of the 
enterprise is removed from its original owners’.6 
      These types of corporate rescue structures generally allow management to stay in 
place, while giving sufficient time to come up with a rescue plan, whereas traditional 
insolvency laws emphasis on the settlement of creditors’ claims.7 Thus, a key feature 
of modern rescue regimes, in line with international practice is the preparation and 
implementation of a rescue or reorganisation plan.8 The plan seeks to maximise, 
preserve and possibly even enhance the value of a debtor’s business enterprise, in 
order to maximise payment to the creditors of the distressed debtor company.9 In this 
regard, an insolvency practitioner drafts a plan that will assist enable company 
turnaround, in most instances; such a plan has to be approved by the creditors of the 
company. 
1.1.2 Judicial Management 
The current corporate rescue regime in Botswana is judicial management, as 
provided for under the Companies Act Cap 42:02 of 2003(‘Botswana Companies 
Act’).10This is a regime which allows the court to grant an order whenever an 
application to the court for liquidation is made and the court is satisfied that there is a 
reasonable probability that if the company is placed under judicial management it 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 S Frisby ’In Search of Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) Modern Law Review 67 247 
at 248. 
7 Ibid. 
8 DA Burdette ‘Some Initial Thoughts on the development of a modern and effective Business rescue 
Model South Africa’ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 241 at 259. 
9 A Smits ‘Corporate Administration- A proposed Model’ (1999) De Jure at 80. 




will remove the occasion for liquidation or dissolution.11 This order may be granted 
by the court on the application of any member or creditor, if it appears to the court 
that by reason of mismanagement or any other cause it is desirable that the company 
be placed under judicial management.12 Thus this regime is wholly administered 
through the courts, making it an inflexible corporate rescue mechanism. 
      Furthermore, judicial management emphasises the creditor’s interests, and stands 
in contrast to the aim of rescuing a debtor from financial difficulty, which aim is 
advanced by modern corporate rescue regimes. Thus the regime is creditor friendly 
compared to the modern corporate rescue which is more debtor friendly. 
1.2 Justification for study 
This study is conducted in order to highlight the inadequacies of judicial 
management as a corporate rescue regime in light of advantages associated with 
other successful corporate rescue regimes and make recommendations for reform 
regarding the current operational regime in the case of Botswana. 
        Judicial management as a corporate rescue regime in Botswana as was in South 
Africa13 has proven to have a number of short comings when compared to modern 
corporate rescue regimes. One of the major problems of judicial management is the 
fact that it is solely administered by the courts.14 Having a court administered regime 
is costly and time consuming as much money is spent on legal fees and cumbersome 
court processes. This is unlike modern corporate rescue regimes which are flexible in 
that they are to a large extent self-administered under the supervision of an 
independent insolvency practitioner. The move from court supervision to self-
administration will save significant costs and enable financially distressed small 
companies to consider corporate rescue as an available alternative to liquidation. 
Owing to its heavy reliance on court proceedings, judicial management has further 
been regarded as unattractive because the order affects the creditworthiness of a 
company detrimentally, even after the order is later set aside.15On the contrary, the 
likelihood of this happening in a modern rescue regime is minimal as it is not 
                                                          
11S 471(1) Botswana Companies Act. 
12 S 471(2) Botswana Companies Act. 
13Judicial management was imported from South Africa, however, the regime was said to be outdated. 
14Cilliers, Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) at 478. 




necessary for a company to get the court’s approval in order to obtain the protection 
that corporate rescue has to offer.  
      The Botswana Companies Act16 states that during liquidation proceedings, the 
court may decide whether to grant a judicial management order or make an order for 
liquidation. The courts of Botswana are usually reluctant to grant a judicial 
management order as it is considered to be a drastic remedy17due to the fact that 
creditors of a company that is unable to pay its debts are entitled to use liquidation in 
order to recover payment.18  This reluctance on the part of the courts then means that 
the courts will readily grant a remedy for liquidation instead of judicial management. 
In this regard, liquidation has been considered as a drastic measure the effect of 
which may be described as the guillotining of a company.19 According to Bradstreet, 
‘Granting such an order of liquidation results not only in the demise of the corporate 
entity and the attendant loss of jobs but it may also disrupt other businesses.20 It is 
therefore desirable to have legislation that is effective in providing escape routes 
against such commercial deaths, such legislation that is aimed at rescuing a 
financially distressed company from its decline towards liquidation.’21 
      Furthermore, the courts have refused to grant a judicial management order upon 
the application of a company, where the court was not satisfied that the company is 
unable to pay its debts. 22 Thus, companies may have foresight of potential financial 
distress, which the courts may refuse to appreciate, in the long run leading to 
liquidation. This is unlike modern rescue proceedings which encourage early 
recognition and treatment of insolvency.23 A modern day corporate rescue regime 
makes room for rescue where there is likelihood of the company becoming insolvent 
in the near future. One such example is the South African corporate rescue regime; 
which provides for commencement of business rescue when it is reasonably unlikely 
that a company will be able to pay its debts when they fall due for payment in the 
immediate ensuing six months or that there is likelihood of insolvency in the 
                                                          
16 S 471 Botswana Companies Act 
17 BP Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Gladen Supplies (Pty) Ltd and others 168-1970 BLR 30. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bradstreet op cit note 3 at 352, cites P Wood Principles of International Insolvency (2007) at 31. 
20 Bradstreet op cit note 3 at 352. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Macdonald v Coin Botswana (Pty) Limited 2004 (1) BLR 415. 




immediately ensuing six months.24 It is therefore submitted that there is a need for a 
reform to the judicial management regime used in Botswana. 
      The late Professor Kahn Freund wrote that:  
‘Business organisation is in a constant state of flux, and the law cannot hope to keep 
abreast of development if it ascribes to its own provisions the quality of 
immutability. Other branches of Commercial law may content themselves with 
setting up a stable framework and leave the function of adaptation to the contractual 
practice of the business community itself. Company law cannot afford to do this. As 
soon as the privileges of corporate personality and limited liability have been made 
available to the business world, as soon as the handling of vast funds contributed by 
large and small investors has been entrusted to managers who are not subject to the 
law of loan and debt, the law must be on the alert to protect against abuses, the 
investor, the outside creditor, and the public itself. Company law can never reach a 
stage of finality. It is in need of constant revision’.25 
      This statement asserts that company law is not stagnant and is constantly in 
need of reform to meet modern demands and trends. Company Law should be 
up-to-date in order to reflect the country’s economic climate and aspirations.  
According to Kiggundu, an outdated company law is dangerous as it leads to 
unnecessary expense and delay.26 This is the case in the current judicial 
management regime of Botswana which requires the satisfaction of cumbersome 
tests, expenses and delays due to heavy reliance on the courts. Furthermore, 
Kiggundu makes note of the fact that Company law reform in Botswana lags 
behind that in countries such as Britain, South Africa, Canada, United States, 
Ghana and Malawi.27  As a country that aspires to stay relevant and continue 
participating in international trade and attracting new business investments, one 
would then argue that Botswana needs to reform its judicial management regime 
to meet the international insolvency law trends. 
 
 
                                                          
24 S 128(f) Companies Act 2008. 
25 O Khahn-Freud ‘Company Law Reform’ (1946) 9Modern LR at 235. 
26 J Kiggundu ‘Company Law Reform in Botswana: the agenda for the twenty-first century’ (1996) 





1.3 Choice of Comparative law 
Comparing countries with experience in working with reformed corporate rescue 
regimes may assist in indicating issues that should be considered in making 
legislative reform.28 It is useful in realising common themes that emerge in order to 
recognise best practice. 
      Thus an analysis will be made of corporate rescue frameworks of South Africa as 
a country whose laws form the bulk of Botswana’s judicial precedent. Additionally, 
Botswana has a similar version of judicial management as was operative in South 
Africa through its previous Companies Act (‘1973 Companies Act’).29 
       The comparison will also be made with Australia as one of the countries that has 
long standing experience and success with corporate rescue.30 Its long standing 
success with the regime will be beneficial in providing insights into the challenges 
and best practices of implementing this regime.  
      The United Kingdom is a country with a lot of legislative influence over 
Botswana due to its historic ties.31 Additionally, the UK, Australia and South Africa 
are countries that have had official inquiries into their insolvency regimes, which 
subsequently led to new legislation being enacted in those jurisdictions. These 
countries are therefore considered to be examples of modern rescue regimes which 
would serve as a good example to Botswana. 
      The best practices and short falls of these three regimes will also be interrogated 
to propose legislative reform for Botswana in the area of corporate rescue. 
1.4 Research question 
The question to be answered is whether judicial management as a corporate rescue 
regime is still relevant and effective in Botswana and whether there is need for a new 
corporate rescue regime, and if so, what should it be. 
      In answering the question on whether judicial management is effective, a 
discussion will be made of judicial management as a corporate rescue regime in 
                                                          
28 C Anderson ‘Viewing the proposed South African Business Rescue provisions from an Australian 
perspective’ (2008) 1 Potchefstroom Elektroniese Regbland 1 at 1. 
29 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
30  Anderson op cit note 28. 
31 C F Fombad ‘Botswana Introductory Notes’ available at www.ida.up.ac.za/country-




Botswana. The study will also review judicial management cases in other countries 
in order to assess the performance of judicial management as a corporate rescue 
regime. 
      Thereafter a discussion and comparative analysis will be made in respect of the 
different corporate rescue models in Australia, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom, taking the best practices and recommending them for legal reform in 
Botswana as relevant. 
      However, it is worth noting that legislative transplants can be problematic, this is 
so especially if a law is transplanted into an environment that is totally different from 
where it was taken. There is therefore a need to analyse the corporate rescue models 
of the three chosen countries with a view to inform the reform but also make 
recommendations looking at the legislative, economic and political environment 
operative in Botswana. 
1.5 Methodology 
This dissertation is a desktop study. In this regard, relevant primary and secondary 
information sources on the subject will be used. In analysing the primary sources, 
reference will be made to statutory provisions in Botswana, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and South Africa pertaining to corporate rescue. Additionally, secondary 
documents such as books, journals and case law will be used to investigate the 
research question.  
1.6 Chapter Synopsis 
Chapter one has been an introductory discussion on the general framework of the 
dissertation, providing the justification of the study and the research question that the 
dissertation seeks to answer. 
      Chapter two is an overview of the performance of judicial management as a 
corporate rescue regime, particularly looking at the case of South Africa before the 
creation of a business rescue system provided under its 2008 Companies Act.32 This 
chapter will look at the shortcomings of judicial management before the enactment 
of the current legislation on business rescue also keeping in mind that the judicial 
management provisions of Botswana law were introduced from South African 
                                                          




previous Law.33 This chapter will also look into the official management and judicial 
management regimes of Australia and Zimbabwe, which regimes mimicked South 
Africa’s judicial management regime.34 Overall, the discussion will assist in 
illustrating the inherent weaknesses of judicial management as a corporate rescue 
regime in Botswana. 
      Chapter three discusses the concept of judicial management as a corporate rescue 
regime operative in Botswana based on the current Companies Act of Botswana and 
Case Law in-order to build a case for the need to meet modernised corporate rescue 
trends. 
      Chapter four analyses the corporate rescue regimes in Australia, South Africa and 
the United Kingdom by discussing the different models and how they operate in 
ensuring that financially distressed companies are rescued. 
      Chapter five is the recommendations and conclusion that will focus on best 












                                                          
33 Builders Merchants Botswana (pty) Limited v Botoka Construction 1979-1980 BLR 1, per Hayfron 
Benjamin CJ:  
‘The provisions for placing a company under judicial management have no counterpart in 
English Law; they were introduced into Botswana from South Africa’. 
34  See Olver ‘Judicial management in South Africa’ LLD (UCT) 1980 at 19, this regime first 




CHAPTER 2 OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT AS A 
CORPORATE RESCUE REGIME  
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the judicial management regime formerly operative in 
South Africa in order to gain an overview of the inherent weaknesses of the regime 
that may have been transferred into the nation of Botswana through importation of 
the provisions of the said system. A discussion of the 1973 Companies Act will be 
made in so far as it highlights the weaknesses of judicial management as it was then. 
      The chapter will end by looking into the performance of some of the jurisdictions 
that embraced the judicial management regime as was operative in South Africa, 
among them Australia and Zimbabwe.35  With this in mind, this discussion will assist 
in realising whether the said jurisdictions have had to reform their laws or are still 
struggling with the said judicial management regime, in order to add into the inquiry 
as to whether there is a need for a modernised corporate rescue regime. 
       Additionally, this chapter will further assist in gaining background of the judicial 
management regime that is currently operative in Botswana, and associated 
challenges that render it ineffective.   
2.1 Judicial Management in South Africa 
Judicial management saw its first entry into South African company law through the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 with the aim to incorporate a formal corporate rescue 
regime.36  It was a system that aimed at rehabilitating companies that got into 
difficulties which under normal circumstances would lead to winding-up.37 However, 
the regime had inherent weaknesses and the courts had a conservative approach 
toward it as a rescue regime.38 Despite its shortcomings, it was subsequently adopted 
by Zimbabwe39 and Botswana,40 which countries based their judicial management 
legislation on that of South Africa. Australia also went along to implement a system 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 A Loubser ‘Judicial management as a Business Rescue in South African corporate law’ (2004)16 
SA Merc LJ 137 at 139. 
37 P Kloppers, ‘Judicial management-A Corporate Rescue mechanism in need of Reform?’  (1999) 3 
Stellenbosch LR 417 at 429. 
38 Loubser op cit note 36 at 140, referred to the case of Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand 
(Pty) where the judge referred to judicial management as a regime that has barely worked since its 
initiation in 1926. 
39 RH Christie Business Law in Zimbabwe 2ed (1998) at 422. 




of official management which was similar to judicial management as was operative 
in South Africa.41 
2.1.1 Application for Judicial Management Order 
Section 427-440 of the 1973 Companies Act made provision for judicial 
management. In terms of section 427(1) of the 1973 Companies Act, a judicial 
management order could be granted by the court in the following cases: 
a) If  by reason of mismanagement or any cause the company ; 
i)  is unable to pay its debts or probably unable to meet its commitments, 
and  
ii) has not become or is prevented from becoming a successful business 
concern and 
b) there is a reasonable probability that, if the company is placed under judicial 
management, it will be in a position to: 
i) pay its debts or meet its obligations and  
ii) become a successful business concern, then a court may if it appears just 
and equitable grant a judicial management order.42 
      Therefore an application for judicial management could be made by the company 
itself, a creditor,43 member, or one of the aforementioned jointly.44 Although it would 
seem as if this provision balanced the debtor’s and creditor’s ability to apply for 
judicial management, this was not always the case as will be discussed further. It is 
observed that the scale tilted more towards the creditors due to the pro-creditor 
attitude that the courts had developed. 
      Furthermore, the onus of prove that one had to satisfy was too high.45 The 
applicant had to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the company will 
recover to the extent of being able to repay its debts.46 After that, the court still had to 
be satisfied that it was just and equitable to grant such an application.47 In this regard,                
Kloppers has noted that this is one of the reasons why judicial management then 
                                                          
41 Olver op cit note 34 at 19. 
42 1973 Companies Act s 427(1). 
43 1973 Companies Act s 427(2) Including contingent or prospective creditors. 
44 1973 Companies Act s 427(2).  
45 1973 Companies Act s 427(1). 
46 1973 Companies Act s 427(1)(b)(i). 




could not be successfully implemented in South Africa.48 The above provision (‘s427 
(1)1973 Companies Act’) will be discussed in detail below: 
2.1.1.1 Reliance on Court Proceedings 
In terms of the Act,49 judicial management required a court application in order to be 
implemented. This requirement made the procedure costly because money had to be 
spent in financing legal fees, making it unsuitable for small and medium sized 
businesses.50 Additionally, the high costs also made the procedure an unattractive 
option for creditors because the costs incurred in running the process resulted in all 
available funds being spent on the process itself.51  
      Another problem with regard to reliance on the court was the requirement that 
there be a provisional and final order, and this lead to inevitable delays that come 
with court applications. Furthermore (as discussed below in 2.1.1.5-2.1.1.6), the 
ineffectiveness of the procedure could be attributed to the attitude of reluctance that 
the courts showed towards the regime, the courts were not too eager to award such 
order for judicial management. 
2.1.1.2 Reasonable Probability Requirement 
Another contribution to the inadequacy of the regime was the burden of proof that 
the applicant had to bear in proving the company’s eligibility for judicial 
management. In this light, the applicant had to prove that there was a reasonable 
probability that the company will pay its debts in full thus becoming a successful 
business concern.52 According to Rajak and Henning, the requirement of recovery to 
the point of being able to pay all debts in full is unrealistic and often contrary to the 
interests of the creditors and debtors.53 This is so because it may be to the advantage 
of the creditor to accept an amount less than the face value of his claim in order to 
preserve a future supplier or purchaser of his products.54  
      In cases where there was a negative answer as to whether there is a reasonable 
probability of the company recovering under judicial management, it became 
                                                          
48 Kloppers Op cit note 37 at 418, where Kloppers states that the provisions of section 427(1) have 
been criticized for being unrealistic and outdated. 
49 1973 Companies Act s 427(1). 
50 H Rajak & J Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ 262 at 268. 
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irrelevant to continue with the court proceedings as the application would fail.55  This 
then meant that ‘the reasonable probability requirement’ was the ultimate test to be 
proven for judicial management eligibility. 
       Furthermore, one may argue that the Act did not stipulate what amounts to the 
company becoming a successful concern; the above provision is thus vague and 
added to the difficult requirements that had to be proven in order for a judicial 
management order to be granted. 
2.1.1.3 Just and Equitable 
 After proving to the court that a reasonable probability exists that the company will 
recover, the court still went ahead to consider whether it would be just and equitable 
to grant a judicial management order.56 This requirement then made it even more 
difficult to persuade a South African court to grant an application for judicial 
management. In the case of Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) 
Ltd,57 the court held that because of the precarious financial situation of the 
intervening creditor, it would not be just and equitable to grant a judicial 
management order to the applicant. The court in making its decision considered the 
reasons behind the financial difficulties of the company to determine whether there is 
a probability of the company becoming a successful concern and whether it is just 
and equitable to grant the order.  
       Furthermore, the court considered the interests of the creditors and shareholders 
in deciding whether it was just and equitable to grant the order.58 It is therefore 
submitted that because there was no solid framework to determine what was just and 
equitable; the court was at sole discretion to make the determination.59 
2.1.1.4 Mismanagement 
 According to the 1973 Companies Act,60 mismanagement was a factor that could be 
considered as warranting an application for judicial management. Reference to 
mismanagement in this context brought about the perception that the management of 
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the company was to blame for the company seeking to apply for judicial 
management.61 Although this may not have been the intention of the legislation, it 
can be said that the wording of this provision played a role in making directors 
hesitant to apply for judicial management as they avoided the stigma attached to this 
requirement.  
      Furthermore, mismanagement was attached to the inability to pay debts. Thus, 
one could not be permitted to apply for judicial management without proving that the 
company was unable to pay its debts. There was therefore no opportunity to place a 
company under judicial management upon first signs of financial distress. This 
insolvency requirement acted as a barrier that defeated the object of the exercise, 
which was to make the company profitable again.62 
2.1.1.5 Attitude of the Courts 
The courts saw judicial management as being an extraordinary measure, due to the 
fact that creditors of a company that was unable to pay its debts were entitled to 
apply for liquidation in order to recover payment of their claims.63 With this in mind, 
the court would seldom grant a judicial management order against the wishes of the 
creditor unless it was persuaded that doing so would be in the interests of all 
creditors and shareholders.64 
      An aspect that further restricted judicial management as a rescue regime was the 
fact that the South African courts treated it as a remedy that should only be allowed 
in exceptional circumstances.65 This view was further illustrated in the case of Pax 
Clothing Co Ltd v Vaskis Tailoring (Pty) Ltd66 where the court held that judicial 
management was a special privilege given in favour of a company and will be 
authorised in special circumstances. 
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2.1.1.6 Costs attributed to court proceedings 
The reliance of judicial management on court proceedings made it an expensive 
procedure to opt into, especially considering that a lot of money had to be spent on 
legal costs. Olver suggests that judicial management was not a suitable remedy for 
small companies; attributing this to the costs involved in judicial management 
proceedings.67 Although small private companies may have desired to make such 
applications for judicial management, this would be frivolous due to lack of 
sufficient assets to cover the costs. 
2.2 Judicial Manager 
Upon granting a provisional order, the court would hand over the management of an 
unsuccessful company to a judicial manager, thus divesting the persons currently 
managing the company of their powers to manage.68 After taking over management 
of the company, the judicial manager would investigate the situation of the company 
and report it to the meeting of creditors and members.69 During the meeting of 
creditors and members, consideration was made as to whether the company should 
be placed under final judicial management.70After this meeting, the judicial manager 
would report to the court on the prospect of the company being able to become a 
successful concern or to pay its debts within a reasonable time.71 It is upon this report 
that the court would consider whether to grant a final order. During this process the 
judicial manager would continue to run the business under the supervision of the 
master.72  
      A point worth noting in the 1973 Companies Act was that there was no 
requirement for the judicial manager to submit a formal rescue plan stipulating how 
the company will be rescued. This factor has been critiqued because the judicial 
manager could act without a sense of accountability due to the fact that there was no 
stipulated plan setting forth how company turnaround would occur.73 
      Furthermore, a judicial management order could only be terminated by the court, 
this meant that the judicial manager was not placed under pressure to complete his 
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task within a specified period of time and may continue earning fees without any real 
progress.74 Thus, the fact that the judicial manager was not given a specified number 
of days in which to complete his task could be subject to abuse. Furthermore in this 
regard, there was no professional organisation put in place to ensure that the judicial 
manager was held liable for unprofessional or dubious actions.75 
2.2.1 Criteria in Appointment of Judicial Manager 
Another reason why judicial management had limited success in South Africa was 
the insufficient procedure used by the courts in appointing judicial managers.76 There 
was no set criterion for the appointment of judicial managers and therefore the courts 
adopted a traditional practice of appointing liquidators as judicial managers.77  
       Moreover, judicial management was historically associated with liquidation 
because it was included at the end of a chapter on winding-up in the 1926 Companies 
Act, this later matured into the practice of liquidators being appointed by the courts 
as judicial managers.78  Owing to this fact, there was a shortcoming in the procedure 
since a judicial manager’s objective was to carry on trading to restore the business to 
prosperity, contrary to liquidators who generally end business trading in order to sell 
the assets of the business.79 
      Additionally, the appointment of liquidators as judicial managers also constituted 
a conflict of interest because a judicial manager was at liberty to make a 
recommendation for liquidation.80 One may argue that since such judicial managers 
were liquidators, there was a risk that they would readily make recommendations for 
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2.3 Jurisdictions that have taken example of South Africa 
2.3.1 Zimbabwe 
The corporate rescue regime operative in Zimbabwe is also called judicial 
management; the provisions of which have been adopted from those of the 1973 
Companies Act of South Africa.81 Therefore as is the case in Botswana, the 
provisions of judicial management in Zimbabwe are similar to those in the 1973 
Companies Act of South Africa. 
      The Companies Act of Zimbabwe82 provides that an application for a provisional 
judicial management order may be made for the following reasons: 
(i) that by reason of mismanagement or for any other cause the company is 
unable to pay its debts or is probably unable to pay its debts and has not 
become or is prevented from becoming a successful concern; 
(ii) that there is a reasonable probability that if the company is placed under 
judicial management it will be enabled to pay its debts or meet its 
obligations and become a successful concern; and 
(iii) that it would be just and equitable to do so.83 
      It is submitted that the above mentioned provision is identical to s 427 (1) of the 
1973 Companies Act,  as pertaining to grounds for making an application for judicial 
management. There is a similar requirement for the company to show that there is a 
reasonable probability that if the company is placed under judicial management it 
can pay its debts or meet its obligations and become a successful concern. 
Furthermore, as was the case in the 1973 Companies Act, the court must also 
consider it just and equitable to place the company under judicial management.84 
       It appears that the Zimbabwean judicial management regime carries with it some 
of the weaknesses which were found under the judicial management regime of South 
Africa as provided for under the 1973 Companies Act. In this regard, Chizana has 
identified a number of weaknesses in the Zimbabwean judicial management regime 
which appear to have been inherited from that of the 1973 Companies Act.85 He 
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notes that although directors are discharged of their duties, the legal framework does 
not place sufficient motivation on the directors to be part of the rescue process as the 
judicial manager solely carries such responsibility. Furthermore, he submits that 
directors should be kept on board in order to assist the practitioner in rescuing the 
company; this is because directors are ordinarily privy to the information and 
knowledge of the operations of the company.86  
      According to the Zimbabwean Companies Act, as was the case in the 1973 
Companies Act, a company is only placed under judicial management when it is 
unable to pay its debts as they fall due, this lowers the chances of recovery because at 
this stage the company will be very ill.87 Therefore, it can be said that a company is 
regarded as being financially distressed if it is unable to pay its debts, however, it 
may be worth noting that such company may be financially distressed before 
reaching a position of being unable to pay its debts. In this light, Chizana submits 
that there is a need for intervention before a company reaches the stage where it is 
unable to pay its debts as it will be a pre-emptive measure.88 The business will then 
have better chances at survival if rescue begins at signs of financial distress unlike 
the case under judicial management in Zimbabwe.  
      Another weakness identified by Chizana is the fact that there are no detailed 
requirements specifying the presentation of the judicial manager’s plan to rescue the 
business, as was the case in South Africa.89 
      Hufisi, who is a judicial management expert in Zimbabwe, further unfolds the 
weaknesses of judicial management by submitting that the process damages the 
confidence of financiers on the concerned company to the extent that they are often 
reluctant to extend credit lines.90 This was also the case in South Africa where the 
judicial management order affected the creditworthiness of companies.91 Judicial 
management in Zimbabwe is also viewed as being a costly procedure because the 
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fees receive prime consideration over other creditors’.92 One would assume that this 
is so because a lot of money has to be spent on court and administrative fees. 
       Moreover, the fact that the Zimbabwean legislation on judicial management was 
last updated in 1959 is viewed as warrant for reform because much in the world has 
changed since then.93 
       Although judicial management is still operative as a corporate rescue regime in 
Zimbabwe, there is an on-going debate on whether it is an adequate regime or should 
be reformed to align with international regimes.94 
2.3.2 Australia 
In 1961, Australia followed the example of South Africa by introducing official 
management as a corporate rescue regime.95 Although Australia embraced a similar 
concept of judicial management as was operative in the 1973 Companies Act, the 
difference lay in the method by which companies were placed under judicial 
management or official management.96 Official management was therefore 
distinguishable from judicial management in terms of the 1973 Companies Act. 
      While in South Africa only courts could place companies under judicial 
management, in Australia creditors could pass a resolution which places a company 
under official management.97 In this case, official management was not heavily 
reliant on the courts as was the case of judicial management in South Africa. 
However, the approach used under official management also had its weaknesses as a 
resolution had to be passed by creditors and creditors are not always objective 
compared to the court which may consider the facts impartially.98 Creditors also 
played a role in judicial management as the official manager had to give a report to 
the courts after a meeting with the creditors, which report the courts considered in 
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deciding whether to award a final order.99 The courts in this case were not bound to 
follow the views of the creditors; they were at liberty to consider other factors.100  
      The major difference between the two systems is that the Australian system was 
not reliant on judicial supervision whereas the South African system was subject to 
the supervision of the Courts. Olver notes that the Australian system was ‘creditor 
management’ as opposed to ‘judicial management’, one was court oriented and the 
other relied on resolution of creditors.101 Another notable difference between the two 
systems was that in the case of official management, creditors where the ones who 
chose the official manager, whereas in the case of South Africa, the judicial manager 
was appointed by the courts.102  
      There was no provisional procedure in Australia because the courts decided 
whether to place a company under official management, whereas in the case of 
judicial management there was a provisional procedure put in place in order to obtain 
the views of creditors before the court makes a final order.103 The procedure of 
judicial management was subject to the Courts as they could disregard the views of 
the creditors in making a final order, which is why judicial management has been 
criticised for its heavy reliance on court proceedings.104  Furthermore, the 1973 
Companies Act did not stipulate the time period within which a company must have 
had rehabilitated itself, in the case of Australia the company was to be placed under 
official management for a period not exceeding two years.105  
      No notable statistics of official management performance in Australia has been 
officially recorded. 106Although Australia took the example of official management 
from South Africa, it appears from the differences in the two systems that Australia 
made the system unique to the Australian economy. Some of the areas which lead to 
failure of judicial management system in South Africa were not adopted by the 
official management system.   
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      However, Australia later took steps towards adopting a modernised corporate 
rescue regime in the form of voluntary administration as a move to a modernised 
corporate rescue regime. In considering reforming the corporate regime, the 
Australian Commission of inquiry had the opportunity of considering the English 
model of administration and the chapter 11 procedure of the United States of 
America.107   
       Under official management, Australia took example of judicial management and 
made it unique to itself. In the case of South Africa as regards its ‘business rescue’ 
regime, one would question whether it was a wise decision to completely overhaul its 
corporate rescue regime instead of modernising the judicial management that was in 
place. According to Kloppers, there was a need for a complete overhaul of the 
judicial management regime because there was a bad attitude attributed to the regime 
as it was viewed as an extraordinary measure.108  
      The popularity of modern corporate rescue regimes worldwide and the fact that 
judicial management had not been very successful in South Africa resulted in a 
number of commentators calling for a review of the South African corporate rescue 
procedure.109  
Conclusion 
An overview of judicial management in South Africa and in countries which took 
example from its regime shows that judicial management as a corporate rescue 
measure has not been an effective remedy and that there is a drive and move towards 
the trend of adopting modernised corporate rescue regimes as seen by the steps taken 
by South Africa and Australia. While Zimbabwe has not taken steps to reform its 
judicial management regime; the current commentary suggests that the regime is 
ineffective and desirous to be traded for a modernised rescue regime which would 
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CHAPTER 3 OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses judicial management as a corporate rescue regime operative in 
Botswana. More specifically, there will be a discussion on the historical development 
of the regime and its current status .The discussion will be based upon the current 
Companies Act of Botswana110 and available case law.  
      In relation to the actual judicial management regime, the discussion will deal 
with the key aspects that make up the regime in Botswana in order to illustrate its 
ineffectiveness. 
3.1 Historical Background 
 As will be discussed, the law governing company operations in Botswana is part of 
the received law and is to a large extent based on English law.111 In 1885, Botswana 
was declared a protectorate, and from then onwards it was ruled from the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope.112 The Order-in-Council of 9 May 1891 established the 
Office of the High Commissioner of Botswana,113 who was required to respect any 
native laws by which the civil relations of the people of Botswana were regulated.114  
At that time, having a company as a means of doing business was unknown and 
business transactions were mainly done by way of barter. 
      On the 10 of June 1891, the High Commissioner issued a General Administration 
Proclamation115 which provided that the laws in force at the Cape of Good Hope 
would mutatis mutandis be the law in force and observed in Botswana.116 At that 
time, the law applicable at the Cape of Good Hope was the Roman-Dutch Law. This 
law was a hybrid system consisting of Roman-Dutch common law principles and 
English statutory and common law principles introduced in the Cape.117 Therefore, 
by virtue of the 1891 Proclamation, Botswana received the Company Law statutory 
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enactments and common law principles that were applicable at the Cape at that 
time.118   
      Thus the reception of South African company law into Botswana included the 
South African system of judicial management. As such, looking at the historical 
development of Company law in Botswana illustrates that this area of the law is 
highly influenced by English and South African Law.  
3.2 Definition and Purpose 
Judicial management in the context of Botswana is defined as the process in which 
the court places the management of the company’s affairs in the hands of a judicial 
manager, who then runs the company under the supervision of the Master of the High 
Court.119 In this regard, the purpose of judicial management is to enable companies 
suffering a temporary setback due to mismanagement or other circumstances to 
become a successful business once more.120 Thus the primary duty of the judicial 
manager is to make an effort to ensure that the company becomes successful 
again.121 However, one would then question the efforts of the judicial manager 
because as will be explained further, such a position is usually occupied by 
liquidators. Furthermore, it would be contradictory to assume that individuals trained 
in liquidating companies are able to effectively make an effort at rescuing the 
company. 
3.3Judicial Management under the Companies Act of Botswana 
The Botswana Companies Act makes provision for judicial management. One 
notable issue concerning this provision is its title which reads as, ‘Winding Up and 
Judicial Management’. This way of arranging the companies Act seems to have been 
adopted from the 1973 Companies Act of South Africa which made the provisions on 
judicial management fall at the end of a chapter on winding-up.122 It is submitted that 
this title may bring about uncertainty as it seems to suggest that winding up and 
judicial management operate identically, this is similar to the position under the 1973 
Companies Act, where the arrangement of the Act matured into the practice of 
appointing liquidators as judicial managers. Furthermore, this reflects the attitude of 
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reluctance that the courts have towards judicial management in Botswana. The title 
does not demonstrate the importance of an efficient rescue culture in company law 
and is suggestive of the idea that winding up and judicial management are of the 
same class. As such, a sufficient example of statute that has succeeded in 
emphasizing the importance of rescue culture is Chapter 6 of the South African 
Companies Act, which dedicates an entire chapter towards business rescue 
proceedings.123 Judicial management should not be seen to operate interchangeably 
with winding-up as one concept intends to prevent the other; they are opposing 
proceedings and cannot be structured in one chapter. It is thus argued that placing the 
two concepts under one title and chapter suggests that they are ad idem.  
      Furthermore it is submitted that the pro creditor mindset attached to this regime 
in Botswana is as a result of its reception from South Africa. In this regard, Olver has 
noted the following: 
‘The Judicial management section acted as encouragement to judicial managers to 
make no serious attempt to carry on the company’s business but to proceed at once 
to liquidate its assets for the purpose of paying creditors. Judicial management thus 
became established as a process of winding-up without any kind of control by the 
court’.124 
      As will be further discussed, this is a reflection of the judicial management 
regime as it currently stands in Botswana. 
3.4 The Judicial Management Process 
According to section 471 of the Botswana Companies Act, judicial management may 
be commenced in one of two ways: 
(i) By order arising from a liquidation application,125 and 
(ii) By way of an order arising from application for judicial management.126 
      This process of judicial management commencement is solely court oriented, as 
compared to modern corporate rescue regimes which seem to support the out of court 
entry route. 
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3.4.1 Order arising from liquidation application-s 471(1) 
Firstly, a judicial management order may be granted by the court under the following 
circumstances: 
‘Where an application is made to the court for the liquidation of any company on the 
ground that such a company is unable to pay its debts or that by reason of its 
mismanagement or of its probable inability to meet its obligations or become a 
successful concern or for some other cause, it is just and equitable that the company 
should be wound up, but the court upon consideration of the facts, is of the opinion 
that notwithstanding any present inability of the company to meet its obligations, or 
the existence of any other fact or circumstance alleged in the application, there is a 
reasonable probability that if the company be placed under judicial management as 
provided in this section it will be enabled to meet such obligations and to remove the 
occasion for liquidation or dissolution, and that it is otherwise just and equitable that 
the granting of an order of liquidation should be postponed’127 
      It is submitted that this provision is insufficient; this is so because the complete 
discretion awarded to the courts in deciding whether it is just and equitable for a 
company to be placed under judicial management is prone to misuse.  In the High 
Court case of Macdonald v Coin Botswana (Pty) Limited,128 an application had been 
brought by the applicant for the judicial management of the respondent.  The 
applicant company was in a parlous financial situation and unable to pay its debts. 
Despite evidence from accountants to the effect that the company was in a bad 
financial state, the court held that there was no evidence to show that the company 
was facing difficulties which were beyond the capabilities of existing management  
and  that there was accordingly no basis for the application  for judicial management.  
In this regard, the courts of Botswana also seem to have developed an attitude of 
reluctance towards judicial management as they are caught between having to protect 
the rights of creditors and providing a moratorium for the company via judicial 
management. It is submitted that because of the attitude of reluctance that the courts 
have, it is difficult for even ‘rescuable’ companies to be allowed to access judicial 
management. 
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3.4.2 Order arising from application for judicial management-s 471(2) 
Lastly, a judicial management order may also be granted by the court in the 
following circumstances: 
‘ …in respect of a company on the application of any member or creditor, if it 
appears to the court that, by reason of mismanagement or any other cause, it is 
desirable that the company should be placed under judicial management’. 129 
      In terms of section 471(1),130 the test for placing a company under judicial 
management is that of ‘reasonable probability’. As such, there must be a reasonable 
probability that if the company is placed under judicial management it will recover, 
namely that it will be able to pay its debts and become a going concern. However, 
the test in section 471(2) is that of ‘desirability’, the provision states that a judicial 
management order may be granted if it is desirable, thus, it must be desirable that the 
company be placed under judicial management. This then implies that section 471131 
contains two tests. One may suggest that the reason behind the two tests is that one is 
done during a liquidation proceeding, which then means that more discretion is 
awarded to the court. However, the second application is done by the members and 
creditors of the company, which implies that the test lessens the discretion placed 
upon the courts. Although this is the case, even though the members and creditors of 
the company may desire judicial management, because of the attitude of reluctance 
the courts have towards judicial management, the application may not yield the 
desired outcome.132 Furthermore, the court in concluding the test will not only 
consider whether the application is desirable only for the applicant but will have to 
consider other parties as well. This then makes it a complicated task for the courts, 
because members and creditors may not always want the same thing. 
      The dicta of the Court of Appeal judges’ carries weight and thus lower courts 
often refer to them in carrying out decisions.133 Cases that have been decided by the 
Court of Appeal in Botswana can be implied to be the position of the law as it stands 
in Botswana. In this light, in the case of BP Distributers (Pty) Ltd v Gladen Supplies 
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(Pty) Ltd,134 the applicant had petitioned the court of appeal of Botswana for judicial 
management orders with respect to two companies which were in a bad financial 
state. The judge in this case, Dendy Young CJ, refused to grant the judicial 
management order on grounds that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable 
probability that the companies would overcome their difficulties if placed under 
judicial management.  The judge was of the view that the overriding test is that of 
reasonable probability-that is to say there must be a reasonable probability that the 
company will recover if placed under judicial management.  Although the test is 
objective, one may not know what the judge considers in deciding whether a 
company will be able to recover. The decision then is based on what the judge thinks 
to be a reasonable probability that if the company is placed under judicial 
management, it will recover. It is thus submitted that courts in Botswana do not seem 
to identify with rescue culture, and the reasonable probability test also plays a role in 
fuelling the court’s reluctance to place companies under judicial management. 
Moreover, the legislation does not tell judges what to look for in making a decision, 
they cannot be expected to be well versed on the viability of companies. 
      Additionally, the judiciary is responsible for upholding creditors’ rights and 
therefore, taking a risk in trying to rescue a company that has no plan would not be a 
priority to judges. In the case of Builders Merchants Botswana v Botoka 
Construction (Pty) Ltd,135 a group of the respondent company’s creditors petitioned 
to have the company wound-up. Another group of creditors counter-petitioned as 
they favoured having the company placed under judicial management. The court in 
this case refused to grant the judicial management order because the group counter-
petitioning had failed to show that there was a reasonable probability of the company 
recovering if placed under judicial management, a provisional liquidation order was 
granted instead. The burden of proving that there is a reasonable probability that the 
company will recover is on the petitioner. In this regard, Kiggundu submits that 
proving reasonable probability is a heavy burden to bear.136  
      Judges have attempted to justify why they are reluctant to grant judicial 
management as a remedy. In the BP Distributors case,137 Dendy Young CJ said that 
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judicial management is a fairly drastic remedy to apply, especially because it is 
coupled with an order that whilst in force, all actions and execution of writs, 
summons and other processes against the company may not be pursued without leave 
of the court.138 He further points out that such an order would in effect inhibit 
litigation against the company.139  
      In highlighting the position of the courts in Botswana, Hayfron-Benjamin CJ in 
the Builders Merchants140 said:  
‘The company in this case is involved in the sensitive areas of higher defense. A 
serious   disruption of work on the projects should if possible be avoided. It is true 
that creditors have a right to put a company which is incapable of paying its debts 
into liquidation. But all rights, even those considered fundamental must be 
exercised without prejudice to the national interest’. 
      The decisions in the Builders Merchants Botswana and BP Distributors cases are 
judgments of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal is a superior court, it being 
the final court of appeal in the case. Botswana courts are thus obliged to take regard 
of the doctrine of stare decisis, in which decisions of superior courts are binding on 
inferior courts.141 Currently, it may be concluded that the attitude of reluctance 
towards judicial management is the position of the courts in Botswana.  
      Kiggundu has highlighted that an outdated company law is dangerous because it 
leads to unnecessary expenses and delay.142 He further points out that this is 
problematic as time-consuming formalities have to be followed, procedures and 
forms for doing things then become embedded in administration and practice, and 
mystique develops, which is understood only by a few legal specialists.143 This gives 
rise to a procedure that is inflexible and expensive as a result of many formalities, 
procedures and tests. One may submit that this is a reflection of judicial management 
in Botswana as an outdated procedure that is inflexible and costly. 
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3.4.3 Moratorium   
In the event that the petitioners discharge the burden of proving that there is a 
reasonable probability that the company will recover, the court may grant a judicial 
management order to be in force for the period that is stipulated in the order.144 In 
this regard, the court may direct that while the judicial management order is in force, 
all actions and the execution of all writs, summonses, and other processes against the 
company be stayed and be not proceeded  without leave of the court.145  The use of 
the word ‘may’ implies that the stay in executions (moratorium) is not mandatory; it 
then creates uncertainty as to whether the court will include the moratorium in 
judicial management. This is unlike most modern corporate rescue regimes which 
have automatic moratoriums that operate upon commencement of corporate 
rescue.146  
      Furthermore, the court may vary the terms of the order at any time and in any 
manner it deems fit, 147 a fact that that illustrates the heavy reliance of the regime on 
the courts, and the absolute discretion granted to the judges as pertaining to judicial 
management. However, judges are not trained to rescue companies but to litigate, 
which duty includes upholding rights of those that are entitled or aggrieved, i.e. 
creditors. 
3.5 The Judicial Manager 
 3.5.1 Qualifications 
One of the shortcomings of the Botswana Companies Act, as was the case under the 
1973 Companies Act, is that it does not stipulate the qualifications that a judicial 
manager is required to have. The Act only stipulates that judicial managers should 
not be auditors of the company.148 Although this approach seems to prevent conflict 
of interest in upholding the independence of the judicial manager’s office, it is 
submitted that it is insufficient. As such, there are no stipulated skills or requirements 
that persons occupying the office of the judicial manager are required to satisfy, thus 
one may suggest that such approach is not rescue-specific. According to Bradstreet, 
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qualifications of those that rescue the company are crucial as the success of the 
rescue procedure depends on them.149 Thus one would then be displeased by the fact 
that the qualifications of the office of the judicial manager are not defined in the Act. 
Accordingly the fact that judicial managers’ qualifications are undefined has led to 
liquidators being casually appointed in this office with the assumption that they 
would do a better job in turning the company around.150 
3.5.2 Appointment  
Judicial managers are appointed in terms of Section 382, 151 which requires that the 
names for appointment of liquidators be submitted when the final winding-up order 
has been made.152 This then implies that judicial managers are appointed in the same 
manner as liquidators; this would further be suggestive of the fact that liquidators are 
appointed to be judicial managers in the judicial management procedure.153 In this 
regard, one of the reasons for the failure of judicial management in South Africa was 
the fact that liquidators were appointed as judicial managers.154 This is problematic 
because liquidators are trained in winding up companies. It is submitted that they 
will not be of much assistance in ensuring company turnaround because they are 
accustomed to dismantling companies. 
3.5.3 General Duties 
The judicial manager is allocated several statutory duties under the Act,155 these 
duties include: 
‘(a) to recover and reduce into possession all the assets of the company, and 
undertake the management of the company after his appointment 
(b) to manage the company subject to the order of the court, in such manner that he 
sees as being most economic and conducive to the interests of the members and 
creditors 
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 (c) to comply with any direction of the court made in the judicial management order 
or any variation thereof, 
(d) to keep such books of account, and to prepare a balance sheet and profit and loss 
account, 
(e) to convene the annual general meeting, during the period that the company is 
under judicial management and to furnish to the persons entitled thereto a report 
containing such information as is required’.156 
      It is observed that among all these duties, there is none requiring the judicial 
manager to make a rescue plan as is common among modern corporate rescue 
regimes. Thus the judicial manager doesn’t have to make a plan proposing how 
company turn around will be attempted. However, the rescue plan is a key feature in 
modern corporate rescue regimes, which cannot be ignored.157  Furthermore, the 
rescue plan is important as it makes corporate rescue process more transparent as all 
stakeholders are able to see where the company is going and vote and deliberate on 
how the practitioner is going to formulate a plan to turn the company into a profitable 
entity.158 
3.5.4 Application of assets  
Generally, the judicial manager is not permitted to sell or dispose of any of the 
company’s assets without leave of the court.159 However, he or she may dispose of 
the company’s assets without leave of the court if it is in the ordinary course of the 
company’s business.160  One would suggest that this is done in order to prevent 
abuse, this is so because the judicial manager is prevented from freely disposing the 
company’s assets outside the ordinary course of business, 
      The creditors of the company whose claims arose before the date of the judicial 
management order may at a meeting convened by the judicial manager resolve that 
all liabilities incurred or to be incurred by the judicial manager in the conduct of the 
company’s business be paid on preference to all other liabilities, exclusive of the 
costs of the judicial management.161 Thereupon all claims based upon such first-
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mentioned liabilities shall have preference in the order in which they were incurred 
over all unsecured claims against the company, except claims arising out of the costs 
of the judicial management.162  
3.6 Liquidation as a fall-back position 
Although liquidation is not always the enemy, especially in cases where companies 
have no sign of being able to recover, a company should be given a fair chance at 
survival. This is so especially with the trend of appointing liquidators as judicial 
managers, which implies that even if a company is placed under judicial 
management, it may end up being liquidated. Furthermore, the courts have developed 
an attitude of reluctance towards the regime, in such a case; liquidation may be the 
option that the courts choose to take over judicial management. It is submitted that in 
Botswana companies are not given a fair chance at survival, due to judicial 
management being a shadow behind liquidation. 
      This being said, Botswana is a small country with a population estimated at 
2,05million.163 It consists of an economy of mainly small to medium sized 
companies. In this light, an efficient and well-functioning corporate rescue procedure 
has advantages for every country and every type of economy; these advantages are 
even more relevant in developing countries where the preservation of jobs is of 
primary concern.164 The economy would thus experience difficulty due to companies 
that go through liquidation when they can benefit from an effective corporate rescue 
regime. 
       Modubule in demonstrating his concerns of the liquidation of a giant transport 
company, Lobtrans, where 500 jobs were affected, stated that the liquidation would 
exacerbate the unemployment situation that is already existent in Botswana.165 
Furthermore, in February 27 2015, over 800 jobs of employees working at Discovery 
Metals Bosetu Mine were affected after the mine was shut down.166 The decision in 
this regard was whether to auction or liquidate the company. Under the modern 
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corporate rescue regimes, one may place a company in corporate rescue where it can 
be perceived that in the coming future the company may enter into financial distress. 
A company in this case would thus have a higher chance of survival as a forecast 
could be made to determine the viability of the company in the preceding months. 
      The attitude of the courts may end up resulting in companies being liquidated 
prematurely resulting in the consequences being felt by the economy of the country, 
including high levels of unemployment. Therefore, a small country like Botswana, 
which is already troubled by unemployment, cannot afford to face additional job 
losses in the economy due to liquidation. 
Conclusion 
Although Botswana has made an attempt at having a formal corporate rescue in the 
form of judicial management, it is necessary to create legislation that is aimed at 
rescuing ailing companies from their decline towards liquidation. The fact that the 
courts are reluctant to apply the remedy, places a limitation on the success of the 
current remedy. Moreover, the high interference of the courts towards access of the 
judicial management process is the major reason why the regime as a whole is 
insufficient. In turn, the aim that the regime seeks to promote, which is to rescue 
ailing companies becomes defeated.  
      Countries globally are moving towards accommodating modern corporate rescue 
regimes. These regimes recognize corporate rescue as a necessary alternative to 
liquidation, and operate on the basis that the value of the company is greater if it, or 
its business is preserved as a going concern, as opposed to the assets being sold off 
on a piecemeal basis. Botswana should not be an exception in flowing with the 












CHAPTER 4 CORPORATE RESCUE IN SOUTH AFRICA, AUSTRALIA 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Introduction 
Corporate rescue strategy is firmly established in most developed corporate systems 
across the globe,167 among them, South Africa, United Kingdom and Australia which 
countries may be regarded as having modernised corporate rescue regimes. 
      This chapter is a comparative analysis of the corporate rescue regimes operative 
in South Africa, United Kingdom and Australia, thereafter setting out the differences 
and similarities of the regimes. 
      The corporate rescue procedure is extensive and therefore only the major 
components that make up this process will be discussed in this chapter. All corporate 
rescue regimes comprise of three distinct steps which are: 
(i) commencement 
(ii) investigation and development of plans, 
iii) and decision making.168  
      These steps will then be discussed as pertaining to each jurisdiction and at the 
end of each step there will be an analysis in order to make a comparison. It is notable 
that making a comparison among jurisdictions where the stated aims are the same is 
useful as an indicator of issues to be considered in making legislative reform.169 
      The relevant legislation in each jurisdiction will be considered-viz. the South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘Companies Act 2008), the Australian 
Corporations Act 50 of 2001(Corporations Act 2001) and the United Kingdom 
Insolvency Act of 1986(UK Insolvency Act).  
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4.1 Definition and Aims of the corporate rescue regimes 
4.1.1Australia 
The corporate rescue regime operative in Australia is termed ‘voluntary 
administration’170and is provided for under part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 
2001.This is a procedure that attempts to allow companies in financial distress time 
to develop and implement a restructuring plan with its creditors.171 Section 435A of 
the Act172 specifies that one of the objectives of the procedure is to ensure that the 
business, property and affairs of the company are administered in such a way that 
maximises the chances of the company or as much of its business as possible 
surviving. Where this aim is not possible, the next objective is to generate results that 
will bring a better return for the company’s creditors and members than would be 
from an immediate winding up of the company.173  
4.1.2 South Africa 
Similarly, an equivalent procedure termed ‘business rescue’ is operative in South 
Africa under Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. 174 However in South Africa the 
procedure is defined in more detail: 
‘Business rescue means proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that 
is financially distressed by providing for: 
(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its affairs, 
business and property; 
(ii) a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in 
respect of property in its possession; and 
 (iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the                 
company by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, 
and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in 
existence on a solvent basis or, if it is not possible for the company to so continue in 
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existence, results in a better return for the company’s creditors or shareholders than 
would result from the immediate liquidation of the company’.175 
      This definition seems to encompass all the components that make up business 
recue in South Africa. It is thus a summary of the regime in its entirety.  
4.1.3 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the corporate rescue procedure is known as Administration 
and is provided for under the Insolvency Act of 1986.176 The main objective of 
administration is to ensure that the administrator pursues the rescue of the company 
as a going concern.177 An alternative aim would be to achieve better results for the 
company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound 
up.178   
Analysis 
It appears that the corporate rescue procedures in all three jurisdictions share similar 
primary objectives, one of which is to maximise the likelihood of the company 
continuing on a solvent basis. Although the rescue of a company is paramount, where 
this is not possible, the second objective is to get better results for creditors than they 
would if the company entered liquidation.179 One would submit that the fact that the 
insolvency practitioner strives to get better returns than if a company is under 
liquidation makes this procedure more favourable for creditors and members as 
compared to liquidation.  
4.2 Commencement 
The commencement stage of corporate rescue is important as it provides a gateway 
through which the procedure may be undertaken,180 thus it is important to have a 
simple, affordable and flexible commencement in order for the regime to be easily 
accessed. In cases where there are many rigid and complex procedures used for 
commencement, one may submit that there may be likelihood that the regime will 
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fail because of ineffectiveness and lack of use. Moreover, Anderson has pointed out 
that commencement is important as it establishes the most fundamental issues with 
respect to the advantages that may be taken by corporate participants in the process, 
as well as identifying those that are able to initiate the said regimes to their 
advantage.181  
4.2.1 South Africa 
In South Africa, business rescue may be commenced in one of two ways. Firstly, 
commencement may be done by way of a resolution made by the board of directors 
to voluntarily begin business rescue proceedings, this may be done if the board has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed and there 
appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.182 In this regard, a 
company is regarded as being ‘financially distressed’ when the following ensues: 
(i) it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its 
debts as they fall due and payable within the immediately ensuing six months; or  
(ii) it appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within 
the immediately ensuing six months 
      It is notable that the above mentioned provision does not specifically speak of the 
present inability of the company to pay its debts. This is unlike Australia and the UK, 
which commencement requirements speak to the present and future solvency of the 
company. However this provision may be applauded because once a company sees 
signs of financial distress at an early stage,183 it may make an application for business 
rescue. In this case, the board of directors may commence business rescue 
proceedings by way of a resolution upon obtaining majority vote. The provision only 
requires that the board of directors has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
company is financially distressed and reasonable prospects of being rescued. This 
requirement of commencement is flexible and appears to reduce the difficulty of 
entry.184 One would observe that this entry route encourages directors of financially 
distressed companies to seek help at an early stage rather than waiting until it’s too 
late,185 this is because the test is a simple one which involves the controllers of the 
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company. This then increases the likelihood of a company being successfully 
rescued, as directors will be free to commence rescue before the company becomes 
insolvent. Furthermore, this procedure of commencement is efficient because 
directors are in the best position to know when a company is undergoing financial 
difficulties.  It appears to be advantageous to authorise the board to make such a 
decision because it avoids unnecessary delays and costs that one has to go through in 
the case of commencing by way of the court. The route may therefore be termed as 
being flexible in that it is not complicated and it’s easy to implement.  
      The second way of commencing business rescue is where affected persons186 
apply to a court for an order placing the company under supervision and 
commencing business rescue proceedings, this application may be made at any 
time.187 Loubser has expressed concern regarding the inclusion of employees and 
shareholders as affected persons, reason being that it will not achieve the desired 
results as they may not have the necessary information to prove the requirements of 
rescue.188  
      The fact that this second way of commencement has to be approved by the 
courts, helps in preventing malicious applications and other forms of applications 
made with the intent to abuse the process189. When the application is before the 
courts, there is a consideration of three grounds in deciding whether to place the 
company under business rescue.190 Firstly, the company must be financially 
distressed, secondly, the company must have failed to pay over any amount in terms 
of an obligation under a public regulation or contract, finally, that the court finds it 
just and equitable to do so for financial reasons. The courts are at discretion to decide 
on anyone of the grounds in making a decision, however the fact that the grounds are 
listed in the alternative makes it different from judicial management.  
      Cassim points out that these three thresholds are important as they may prevent 
creditors from placing a company under business rescue simply because they want to 
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pressurize the company.191 The fact that the list of ‘affected persons’ excludes 
directors may be detrimental to directors that believe that the company is under 
financial distress when outvoted, this is because they are not included in the list of 
people that may apply to court. Thus such parties may only apply to court if they are 
both directors and shareholders, otherwise they will not have the required locus 
standi. 
4.2.2 Australia 
In terms of the Australian rescue regime, administration commences when the 
administrator is appointed. There is a wide range of parties that are entitled to 
appoint the administrator. The company may appoint an administrator where the 
board has resolved that in the opinion of directors, the company is insolvent or that it 
is likely to become insolvent at some future time.192  A person is thus insolvent when 
they are unable to pay all of their debts as and when they become due and payable.193 
      In most cases, the company makes the appointment, because once the company 
becomes insolvent or becomes likely to be insolvent; directors may be faced with 
potential liability for insolvent trading.194The legislature’s intention was to allow 
directors to readily and quickly appoint an administrator without unnecessary 
procedures. Murray & Harris note that if directors were required to engage in 
substantial examination, administrations could not be commenced speedily once the 
directors realised that the company had a problem.195 Directors are not required to 
examine the entirety of the company’s financial position or call in experts; they just 
need to form a genuine opinion with regards to the company’s solvency.196 Thus this 
procedure adds to the flexibility towards the entry route. 
      A liquidator or provisional liquidator of the company may also appoint an 
administrator if he or she thinks that the company is insolvent or likely to become 
insolvent ‘in the future’.197 It is a requirement that such person must be a registered 
Liquidator.198 However, it is submitted that this provision is wanting as it does not 
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state how far into the future the insolvency must be likely to be. This is unlike the 
position in South Africa where a time frame of six months is stipulated.199 
      Thirdly, appointment may be made by a secured creditor who has charge over the 
company’s property, where such secured creditor is entitled to enforce the charge.200  
Thus the interest held by the creditor must be in the nature of security and must be 
enforceable.201  Additionally, it is of interest to note that only a qualifying charge-
holder may appoint an administrator, no other creditor may do so.202 In this light, the 
critical question to be raised is whether the competing interest of unsecured and 
secured creditors have been effectively balanced.203 Anderson has noted that the fact 
that no other creditor may make the appointment results in an inequality among 
creditors with regards to effecting appointment.204 Furthermore, the need to have 
insolvent companies put under external administration may be important to 
unsecured creditors because they have no security to rely on205 as they are not given 
a right to apply for administration. As is the case for ordinary creditors, shareholders 
are also excluded from the list of parties that may commence rescue.206 
      It is observed that in Australia there is no provision available for a court to make 
an order that an administrator be appointed; the court is not among the category of 
parties that may commence administration.207 The reasoning behind the exclusion of 
the court is the realisation that court based systems often lead to delays and costly 
litigation that may result in smaller dividends for creditors.208Nevertheless, the court 
may intervene where the administrator is managing the affairs of the company in a 
manner that is prejudicial to the interests of some or all of the company’s creditors or 
members, thereafter making an order that it deems fit.209 Therefore the court in the 
Australian administration regime only appears to play a supervisory role. However, 
as will be discussed below, the court may in some instances enable the application 
for receivership. 
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It is worth noting that Australia also makes provision for another type of external 
administration in the form of receivership. In this regard, receivers are usually 
appointed by a secured creditor when the assets of a company are under threat 
because of the company’s insolvency or financial instability.210 Thus, a receiver is 
appointed in respect of a corporation to take control of property, or to get it, in order 
to protect the rights of the party entitled to the property.211 Keay makes a distinction 
between voluntary administration and receivership by stating the following: 
‘In contrast to receivership (which is based on the underlying secured loan 
document), voluntary administration is a totally legislative invention…While the 
usual initiator of receivership is a secured creditor, voluntary administration is 
typically commenced by the company itself’. 212 
      In this regard, one may point out that receivership is unlike administration in that 
administration is a collective procedure that allows all creditors an opportunity to 
provide input and participate.  
      Receivership is commenced by the appointment of a receiver, which may be done 
by the court213 or privately. Although this regime seems to uphold creditor rights, one 
may submit that unsecured creditors are left out in the cold as they are not given the 
right to commence receivership nor administration. 
4.2.3 United Kingdom 
In the UK, administration takes effect after the appointment of an administrator.214An 
administrator is a person appointed under the Act to manage the company’s affairs; 
business and property whilst under administration with the aim of rescuing the 
company as a going concern.215 The appointment of the administrator may be done 
by an administration order of the court,216 by the holder of a floating charge217 and by 
the company or its directors.218 All these options of appointment provide a level of 
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flexibility as there are provisions for the administrator to be appointed extra-
judicially, by the company itself, the directors or a substantial chargeholder. Above 
all, the court carries a supervisory role in that an application may be made to the 
court where the administration process or administrators are not efficient.219 
      In instances where appointment is made by a holder of a floating charge, it is a 
requirement that such charge must be enforceable. Other creditors who are not 
substantial chargeholders are also included as they are given the option to petition the 
court for an administration order.220 It is submitted that because of this approach, 
unsecured creditors (as interested parties) will not feel left out of the process as they 
will have the option of petitioning the court. However, Robinson submits that given 
that the UK procedure involves a great deal of preparatory work based on company 
information, it will be unusual that a creditor will have access to such information to 
enable it to present a successful petition.221  
      Administration may only be commenced on condition that the company is 
unlikely to be able to pay its debts222 However it is only in relation to appointment by 
the court and an appointment by the company or its directors that there should be a 
conclusion that the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts, the 
requirement does not apply where the appointment is by the holder of a qualifying 
floating charge. Hitherto, in order to have jurisdiction to appoint an administrator, the 
court has to first be notified that the company is or will be unable to pay its debts 
within the meaning of section 123 of the Insolvency Act.223 In Re Imperial Motors 
(UK) Ltd224 , Hoffman J considered two ways in which a company may be deemed 
unable to pay its debts under section 123: 
‘ One is known as the balance sheet test which says that it has to be proved to the 
satisfaction  of the court that the value of the company’s assets is less than the 
amount of its liabilities, taking into account hope or exception on the part of the 
company that it will acquire further assets. The other is the fact that the company is 
unable to pay its debts as they fall due, whatever be the state of its balance sheet’. 
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      There is therefore no jurisdiction to make an administration order in relation to a 
solvent company. This is similar to the position in Australia225 where the criterion for 
administration is a company which is insolvent or likely to become insolvent at some 
future time. 
      Upon appointment, the administrator is required to send a notice of his 
appointment to the company and its creditors.226 However in this regard, there is no 
requirement for employees to be notified of the administration.  
4.2.3.1 Administrative receivership 
As, is the case in Australia, the Cork Committee recognised that companies could 
sometimes be rescued by the appointment of an administrative receiver.227 Not only 
can the floating charge holder appoint an administrative receiver, but the 
appointment can also block the appointment of an administrator.228 Initially, a 
receiver was appointed by a secured creditor holding a floating charge over the 
whole or substantial part of the company’s property. Rajak in describing receivership 
has said the following: 
‘There is the informal control of the debtor by one powerful creditor, the latter’s 
superiority over the other creditors deriving from the proprietary consequences of 
the contract between the debtor and this superior creditor…The best example of this 
institution is the creditor who has security not only over the immovable or fixed 
assets of the debtor (a “fixed charge”), but also over the movable assets of the debtor 
(a “floating charge”). The latter is uncommon and found mainly in common law 
jurisdictions such as England’.229 
      Thus, this procedure is run with the interests of one creditor in mind, the floating 
charge holder.230 One would argue that, the interests of other stake holders such as 
employees and unsecured creditors are then disregarded. However, more proposals to 
administrative receivership have been published as part of an Enterprise Act of 
2002,231 which among others had the effect of curtailing the right of holders of 
floating charges to appoint an administrative receiver of the company. In this regard, 
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because of the Enterprise Act of 2002, there is a diminution of administrative 
receivership as an institution with the option of administrative receivership being 
limited to pre-commencement floating charges.232 Under administration there is 
provision for the appointment of an administrator by a floating charge holder,233 it is 
this method which intends to take the place of the appointment of an administrative 
receiver.234 
4.2.4 Analysis of Commencement 
 The corporate rescue procedures in South Africa, UK and Australia are similar in 
that they are not perpetual but temporary in nature. Furthermore, the regimes all aim 
at rescuing the company as a going concern.235 However Australia is unique in that 
section 435A236 specifies that the company be administered in such a way that 
maximises the chances of it or ‘as much of its business as possible’ surviving. Where 
the business remains in existence after the sale, some or all of the people who 
worked in the business prior to its sale are able to retain their jobs. The work in 
progress may also be completed resulting in almost certainly attaining a higher price 
for the assets of the company, leading to a higher dividend for distribution among the 
creditors and retention of the goodwill attached to the business.237 Additionally, all 
three regimes have a similar secondary objective of creating a better return for 
creditors than would result from a winding up.  
       It appears that all three jurisdictions have an insolvency requirement that must be 
fulfilled in order for rescue to commence.  This insolvency requirement seems to be 
similar,238 although there is a difference in the terminology used. In Australia there is 
a requirement that the company be insolvent or likely to be insolvent ‘at some future 
time’, whereas UK is silent on timing,239 it just requires that the company is or is 
likely to become unable to pay its debts. In South Africa, the insolvency requirement 
is that there be insolvency or inability to pay debts within the immediately ensuing 
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six months. South Africa is unique as compared to Australia and the UK in that it 
sets out a stipulated time frame, which is ‘the immediately ensuing six months’.240 
However, all these requirements speak to the company’s inability to pay its debts. 
      Moreover, UK and South Africa provide an opportunity for commencement by 
way of court application in terms of their rescue provisions, which is not the case 
under the Australian voluntary administration regime. However, in Australia, the 
court is given authority to be able to appoint a receiver.241In this regard, one further 
key distinction among these three countries is the fact that Australia and the UK 
make provision for “receivership”. In this regard, Australia and the UK seem to 
provide an additional regime that appears to be creditor friendly. Although 
receivership may be a desired option for secured creditors, this may not be so for 
unsecured creditors. This is because, the receiver only considers the position of the 
secured creditors, and thus the hope of unsecured creditors to maximise their returns 
is diminished. 
      It has been observed that the Australian and UK procedures may be commenced 
in one of three ways, however in South Africa; commencement may begin in one of 
two ways. There is however a shared consensus in the commencement process of the 
three countries in that people in control of the company, the directors, are given the 
opportunity to commence rescue. As discussed above, allowing directors to 
commence rescue is advantageous as they are the persons best equipped to know 
whether the company is in financial distress as they are in control of the company. 
Additionally, allowing directors to place the company on rescue is advantageous as it 
helps avoid unnecessary delay and costs.242Furthermore Australia is unique as 
compared to the UK and South Africa in that there is provision for direct 
commencement by a liquidator or provisional liquidator where a company is unable 
to pay its debt or unlikely to be able to pay its debt.243 
      A further interesting distinction among these three countries is the fact that they 
have different views pertaining to commencement of corporate rescue when 
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liquidation proceedings have been initiated against the company. Australia244 and 
South Africa245 permit commencement even when liquidation proceedings have been 
initiated. However, in the UK, a person may not be appointed as an administrator of 
a company which is in liquidation.246 
      It is worth noting that in the UK and Australia, shareholders cannot effect 
appointment of the administrator. In South Africa, shareholders are termed ‘affected 
persons’247 and may commence business rescue by making an application to the 
court. In this regard, Loubser has noted that shareholders have a right and reason to 
be involved in a corporate rescue procedure because they have a real interest in the 
outcome.248 This is because a successful rescue will revive their shares and these 
shares will regain at least some of their previous value.249 
4.3 Investigation and Development of Plan 
      It is critical that the affairs of the company be investigated in order to develop a 
plan that will allow the company to be rehabilitated. All the jurisdictions have this 
process in common, although it is initiated in different ways; the aim of the process 
is the same. 
4.3.1 South Africa 
      The investigation procedure in South Arica forms a critical part of the business 
rescue process as there will be a determination of the success of the process. As soon 
as practicable after being appointed, the practitioner must investigate the company’s 
affairs, business, property and financial situation in order to form an opinion as to 
whether there is a reasonable prospect of the company being rescued as defined in 
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4.3.1.1 Business Rescue Practitioner 
4.3.1.1.1 Appointment 
       Appointment of the practitioner may be done in one of two distinct ways. Firstly, 
such practitioner may be appointed by the board of directors if the business rescue 
proceedings are commenced by the board of directors, such appointment must be 
done within a period of five days.251 One may point out that in this regard, South 
Africa is different from Australia and UK, where the appointment of an administrator 
commences rescue. Secondly, the court may make an order appointing as an interim 
practitioner a person who has been nominated by the affected person who applied for 
commencement, however this is made subject to ratification by the holders of a 
majority of the independent creditors.252  The court may make an order setting aside 
the appointment of the practitioner; it must then appoint an alternative practitioner 
who is acceptable to the majority of the independent creditors with voting 
interests.253  
      The practitioner is an officer of the court and must report to the court in 
accordance with the applicable rules of the court.254 One may submit that because the 
practitioner is an officer of the court, he/she will be compelled to do things in an 
orderly manner as they will be under the supervisory umbrella of the court. 
4.3.1.1.2 Qualifications and Duties 
The success of an insolvency regime is heavily dependent on those who administer 
it.255 In this regard, Bradstreet notes that ‘the functions and terms of appointment of a 
practitioner will be pertinent in assessing the merits of a corporate rescue regime’. 256 
This means that it is crucial to appoint a qualified practitioner as the success of the 
rescue procedure is reliant on such an individual. The business rescue practitioner is 
tasked with overseeing the business rescue process and in so doing, developing a 
business rescue plan that will help the company to return to its solvent state.  
      In order for business rescue to succeed, the practitioner must have a high level of 
skill and expertise fit for his position as he will be in management or control of the 
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company and aims to devise a plan that will cause the company to turnaround from 
its insolvent status, thus it is important for such a position to be highly regulated. The 
Companies Act lays down a list of requirements that one has to meet in order to be 
appointed as a business rescue practitioner257. Firstly, it is worth noting that the 
business rescue practitioner is not permitted to have any other relationship with the 
company,258 this ensures that he/she conducts his duties independently. This is 
commendable as it prevents a conflict of interest on the part of the business rescue 
practitioner 
      Furthermore, what is of particular interest is the fact that such business rescue 
practitioners have to be licensed by the Companies Commission.259  These licenses 
do not expire and thus not rescue specific, in this regard, Bradstreet notes the 
following: 
‘It would seem, in principle, preferable to issue licenses on a case-by-case basis, 
rather than license an individual business rescue practitioner to take on whatever 
work he likes…’260 
      The business rescue practitioner is given extensive powers, the most trying one 
being that he has full management control of the company in substitution of the 
board.261 He may delegate power and remove from office any person in the pre-
existing management of the company.262Although the practitioner is given extensive 
authority, he/she is an officer of the court and must report to the court, his powers are 
not without supervision.263 Furthermore he/she is liable for any act or omission 
amounting to gross negligence in the exercise of his powers and functions.264 Thus 
although the practitioner is given extensive powers, there are safeguards put in place 
to ensure that he/she doesn’t abuse such powers. 
      Where the business rescue process concludes with a company being in 
liquidation, a business rescue practitioner may not be appointed as a liquidator,265 
this is unlike in judicial management where the judicial manager was in most cases 
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the liquidator. It is submitted that this is a good thing as it distinguishes the role of 
the business rescue practitioner from that of the liquidator, which roles are not ad 
idem.  
4.3.1.2 Moratorium 
Upon commencement of business rescue, there is an automatic stay on legal 
proceedings against the company, its property, assets and on the exercise of the rights 
of the creditors.266 It may be worth noting that the moratorium is important in the 
rescue procedure as it gives the company breathing space, during which the company 
is able to reorganise and reschedule its debts and liabilities.267 During this breathing 
space, the business rescue practitioner is able to devise a plan in order to achieve the 
purpose of the rescue process.268 However, the moratorium does not entirely remove 
the right to commence legal proceedings against the company; it simply places the 
discretion to do so under the consent of the business rescue practitioner or with leave 
of the court.269 Additionally, criminal proceedings against the company or its 
directors and officers are not subject to the moratorium, they don’t enjoy the 
protection guaranteed by the moratorium.270 This is a good thing as it upholds the 
interests of stakeholders as directors won’t be able to use a procedure that is used for 
financially distressed companies to get away with crimes that they have committed. 
      The suspension of legal proceedings against the company is generally made with 
regard to all the creditors271 of the company.272 The rights of the creditors here are 
only frozen for the duration of the business rescue. According to Bradstreet, even 
though creditors may be inclined to view the moratorium as prejudicing their rights 
of recovery, it is designed to facilitate a successful rescue, which may result in them 
ultimately being repaid in full.273 
      During business rescue proceedings, a company intending on disposing property 
belonging to a third party or secured creditor may only do so upon obtaining consent 
from such third party or creditor, however, such consent will not be required where 
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the proceeds of the disposal are sufficient enough to pay the third party or creditor in 
full.274 
4.3.1.3 Rescue Plan 
The rescue plan is vital as it sets out how the rescue of the company will be achieved. 
This was not a requirement under the 1973 South African judicial management 
model and is thus a feature that is absent in the current rescue regime of Botswana.  
      In this regard, the business rescue practitioner is tasked with making a business 
rescue plan for consideration and possible adoption at a meeting held to consider the 
future of the company.275 In making such a plan, the practitioner must consult the 
creditors, other affected persons, and the management of the company.276 Therefore 
the business rescue plan must contain all the information required to facilitate 
affected persons in deciding whether or not to accept or reject the plan.277 This 
procedure then is helpful in ensuring that all the affected persons make an informed 
decision as they will have all the relevant information at their disposal.  
       Once adopted, the business rescue plan is binding on the company and on each 
of the creditors of the company and every holder of the company’s securities.278 
4.3.2 Australia 
 After voluntary administration commences, the administrator must investigate the 
company’s business, property, affairs and financial circumstances, thereafter forming 
an opinion to assist with the rescue process.279 In this regard, the administrator is 
viewed as being an ‘agent’ of the company as he or she carries broad powers to deal 
with the company’s property and carry on the company’s business.280 
      Where an administrator is unable to conduct investigations because of parties in 
the rescue process, such administrator may seek direction from the court.281 Thus the 
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process is made flexible by the fact that the court is there to prevent roadblocks in the 
process where there are uncooperative parties. 
4.3.2.1 Administrator 
 4.3.2.1.1 Appointment 
Voluntary administration in Australia commences when the administrator is 
appointed, such appointment may be made by a board resolution, liquidator or 
provisional liquidator; or secured creditors (as discussed in 4.2.2 above). 
4.3.2.1.2 Qualifications and Duties 
 Unlike in South Africa, in Australia, an administrator is required to be a registered 
liquidator, who must give consent of his/her appointment in writing.282  As discussed 
above, this would not be a favourable option for South Africa because the 
appointment of liquidators as judicial managers was one of the reasons for the failure 
of its former judicial management regime. 
      There are several people who are disqualified from acting as administrators, 
among them being directors of the company, creditors, employees and auditors of the 
company283. This approach is similar to that in South Africa, where a business rescue 
practitioner is disqualified from acting if he/she has any other relationship with the 
company.284 One may submit that this approach helps in ensuring that the 
administrator acts independently. Appointing someone that is connected to the 
company may lead to bias and thus an issue of conflict of duty may arise. Thus, the 
office of the administrator is highly esteemed and as such the administrator is 
required to be an independent officer, in so doing there must be a declaration of 
relevant relationships.285  
      The administration is short term as within 25 business days of beginning the 
administration, a meeting of creditors must be held to determine whether the 
company should be put into liquidation or a deed of company arrangement should be 
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entered into.286 In South Africa, within 10 business days after publishing the rescue 
plan, the practitioner must convene a meeting of creditors to determine whether the 
rescue plan should be entered into.287 Thus in South Africa, the meeting may be 
extended from time to time until a decision is reached, whereas in Australia there is a 
set extension of up to 45 business days.288 The difference between the two 
jurisdictions is that Australia limits the extension days, whereas South Africa does 
not. Although more time allows thorough investigation to be done, it may also be 
disadvantageous as the company and its creditors may stand to lose a lot if the 
company is eventually liquidated after dragging the process for a long time. 
      Whilst the company is in the process of administration, the administrator takes 
control of the company’s business, property and affairs.289 As in South Africa290, the 
administrator may exercise such power as the company or any of its officers could 
perform if the company were not in administration.291 Therein, the administrator is at 
liberty to decide whether to discontinue the company’s business and dispose of any 
of its property.292 Additionally, as is the case in South Africa, the administrator may 
remove a director from office or appoint another one in his or her place.293 Thus the 
position of the administrator during administration is that of full control over the 
company; however such control is under the supervision of the court.294  In this 
regard, the court may give an order preventing the administrator from disposing of 
the assets of the company if it is not satisfied that the disposal would protect the 
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At the beginning of the administration, a moratorium comes into effect.296 This 
ensures that whilst under investigation and assessment, the company is at an 
advantage of protection granted by the legislation guaranteeing the company a stay in 
proceedings.297 The intention of the legislature in this regard is to protect the 
company from legal proceedings in order to give the administrator room to formulate 
a plan for the future of the company. Whilst the company is under the umbrella of the 
moratorium, court proceedings against the company or its property may only be 
commenced upon the written consent of the administrator or an order of court.298 
       Additionally, the moratorium extends to property in that during administration 
no enforcement process in relation to company property may be commenced, except 
with leave of the court299. Similar to South Africa300 is the fact that the moratorium 
does not operate with respect to criminal proceedings or prescribed proceedings.301 
As discussed above, this is a way of ensuring that directors don’t misuse the 
moratorium to try and get away with crimes that they have committed.302 
4.3.2.3 Deed of Company Arrangement (DCA) 
The administrator may propose a deed of company arrangement in which a plan of 
rescuing the company is proposed. If a DCA is to be proposed by the administrator, a 
copy of the proposed or actual deed of company arrangement should be presented to 
the creditors prior to the second meeting.303 This DCA is a plan comprising issues to 
be taken into consideration, the present condition of the company and the ultimate 
goal of restoring the company to a going concern.304  In this light, one would assume 
that, the DCA, as with the rescue plan in South Africa305 will contain material details 
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that will assist the creditors in making an informed decision as to whether to vote in 
favour of the deed.306  
      At the meeting, if the creditors resolve that the company should adopt the deed of 
company arrangement, the administrator will be given 15 business days to execute 
the deed.307 However, in South Africa, there is no stipulated time given in which to 
execute the rescue plan, the only requirement is that necessary steps be taken to 
implement the adopted plan.308 Furthermore, the administrator must advertise and 
send a notice to each creditor that the DCA has been signed and a copy filed with the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).309 The DCA may be 
varied by a resolution passed at a meeting of the company’s creditors, however it 
may also be varied through an application made to the court by the administrator.310 
      Therein, the rescue procedure in Australia seems to be creditor oriented, in this 
regard, one may question the ability of the affected parties to influence the feasibility 
of the DCA. This is so because creditors have a lot of power and may dictate it to the 
affected parties. South Africa also has a similar approach to the extent that creditors 
must approve the rescue plan.311 However according to King, the requirement that 
creditors approve the DCA may slow down decision making because the 
administrator has to consult the creditors or court, even on minor matters.312 
4.3.3 United Kingdom 
 As in South Africa and Australia as discussed above, similarly in the UK, upon 
appointment, the administrator must as soon as is reasonably practicable investigate 
into the affairs of the company, in so doing, he should require a statement of 
affairs313 of the company from relevant persons314. Each person is required to submit 
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a statement of the company’s affairs to the administrator, and must do so within a 
period of 11 days.315 
4.3.3.1 Administrator 
4.3.3.1.1 Appointment 
As discussed above, the administrator is appointed by an order of court, holder of a 
floating charge or by the company or its directors (as discussed in 4.2.3). 
4.3.3.1.2 Qualifications and duties 
      An individual may only qualify to act as an administrator if he or she is qualified 
to act as an ‘insolvency practitioner’ in relation to the company. In this regard, 
section 390316, has the heading ‘The requisite qualification, and the means of 
obtaining it’. A portion of this section speaks of persons who are not qualified to act 
as insolvency practitioners. 
       One does not qualify to act as an insolvency practitioner if he or she is not a 
member of a recognised professional body.317 Another set requirement is that one 
must hold authorisation granted by a competent authority.318 Moreover, a person is 
not qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner if at that time he has been adjudged 
as bankrupt or his estate is sequestrated, is disqualified from being a director or is 
declared mentally unstable.319  Even though the said provision only talks of persons 
that are ‘not qualified to act as insolvency practitioners’,  it is submitted that the 
‘recognised professional bodies’320 will ensure that the insolvency practitioner is 
properly qualified and licensed to undertake the position. This approach is different 
from the one in South Africa where the Act clearly stipulates that the business rescue 
practitioner must have a license issued by the Commission.321 
      The administrator carries wide powers as conferred by the Act.322 Such 
administrator may do anything necessary or expedient for the management of the 
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affairs, business and property of the company.323 Thus, the powers given to the 
administrator are not defined, he is given wide powers to manage the company as he 
sees fit. Furthermore, upon appointment, the administrator is required to take control 
of all the property to which he thinks the company is entitled to.324 In attempting to 
rescue the company, the administrator may give priority to saving the business where 
this leads to a better result for creditors.325 It can thus be argued that the 
administrator’s priorities are towards the protection of creditors as a whole.326 
      As is the case in Australia327 and South Africa,328 the administrator in the UK 
may remove a director and appoint another one in his or her place.329 However, it is 
submitted that such power of removal may be misused if not monitored. This is so 
because there are no stipulated grounds for removal and there is no requirement for 
the administrator to be under court supervision while exercising such power.330 
4.3.3.2 Moratorium  
The moratorium of the UK is unique in that it has an interim moratorium set in place. 
The interim moratorium applies where an administration application in respect of a 
company has been made and the application has not yet been granted or taken 
effect.331 It applies from the time a copy of the notice of intention to appoint an 
administrator is filed with the court.332   
      In illustrating the function of an interim moratorium, Loubser notes that a general 
moratorium only commences on the granting of an administration order and that in 
the period immediately after the first steps towards administration, the company will 
be vulnerable to actions by creditors who hope to enforce their claims before the 
moratorium takes effect.333 However, the interim moratorium comes to an end when 
the appointment of an administrator takes effect.334 Furthermore, the interim 
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moratorium comes to an end if an administrator has not been appointed within five 
business days of filing the notice of intention to appoint administrator.335  
      When the administrator is appointed, the interim moratorium comes to an end,336 
the general moratorium then comes into effect replacing it. The general moratorium 
applies to a company that is in administration. It appears that at this stage, no 
resolution or order may be passed against such a company for winding up.337 Thus 
the regime provides for a moratorium on insolvency proceedings against the 
company whilst on administration. Additionally, no steps may be taken to enforce 
security over the company’s property except with consent of the administrator or 
permission of court.338 Furthermore no steps may be taken to repossess goods in the 
company’s possession and no legal process may be initiated or continued against the 
company or its property, unless leave of the court or permission of the administrator 
is obtained.339 
4.3.3.3 Rescue Plan  
The administrator is required to make a statement setting out proposals for achieving 
the purpose of administration340. The statement addresses such matters as may be 
prescribed, and where need be an explanation is made as to why the administrator 
thinks that the objectives mentioned cannot be achieved341. Furthermore, the UK 
Insolvency Act makes recommendations as to what the proposals may include, 
among other things, a proposal for voluntary arrangement and a proposal for a 
compromise.342 The administrator is required to send a copy of the statement of his 
proposals to the registrar of companies, every creditor of the company and every 
member of the company.343 During an initial meeting, creditors are given an 
opportunity to approve the proposals or approve them with 
modifications.344However, to guard against abuse, the administrator is required to 
                                                          
335 Schedule B1 paragraph 44(2)(b) UK Insolvency Act. 
336 The interim moratorium ends and the general one takes effect, only when the appointment of the 
administrator takes effect. When the time lapses for the administrator to be appointed, the interim 
moratorium ends and the general one doesn’t come into effect. 
337 Schedule B1 paragraph 42(1)-(3) UK Insolvency Act . 
338 Schedule B1paragraph 43 (1), 43(2) UK Insolvency Act. 
339 Schedule B1 paragraph 43(1), 43(2) UK Insolvency Act. 
340 Schedule B1 paragraph 49 UK Insolvency Act. 
341 Schedule B1 paragraph 49(2) UK Insolvency Act.  
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report on the decisions taken during such meetings, such report is made to the court, 
registrar of companies and such persons as may be prescribed.345 
4.3.4 Analysis 
A common aspect among the three regimes is the fact that they favour placing the 
property and affairs of the company in the hands of an independent person, a 
qualified practitioner. The existing management of the company then loses control of 
the company as it shifts to the practitioner. In undertaking their duties, the 
practitioners may have significant dependence on information and advice of 
directors346. However, such practitioners may remove the director of a company from 
office and appoint another one in his or her place.347 
      Additionally, similar among all the jurisdictions is the fact that there is a 
moratorium put in place which allows companies to have breathing space in order to 
successfully conduct the rescue proceedings. In South Africa, the moratorium applies 
after commencement. However, in the UK there is an interim moratorium which 
operates before commencement, South Africa and Australia don’t have such interim 
moratorium. However, the Australian voluntary administration is voluntary by nature 
and will not require such interim moratorium. Furthermore, UK provides a unique 
moratorium against winding up during rescue. In this regard, no resolution or order 
may be passed for the winding up of the company during administration.348 
However, in South Africa, contrary to the position in the UK, the court may convert 
business recue proceedings into liquidation proceedings.349 
      Also similar among the jurisdictions is the fact that the moratorium is not 
absolute. Whilst the company is under rescue, court proceedings in relation to the 
company and its property may be commenced upon the practitioner giving consent or 
by leave of court. Furthermore, in all the three jurisdictions, the moratorium does not 
apply to criminal proceedings. 
      The court is given a supervisory position in all the three jurisdictions; this is so 
even in Australia where the court doesn’t play a role in commencement of voluntary 
                                                          
345 Schedule B1 paragraph 53 UK Insolvency Act. 
346  Keay op cit note 391 at 112. 
347 S140(1)(c) Companies Act 2008, s442A Corporations Act 2001, Schedule B1 paragraph 61 UK 
Insolvency Act. 
348 Schedule B1 paragraph 42(1)(2) UK Insolvency Act. 




administration. These jurisdictions all attempt to minimise the role of the court in 
rescue. Unlike in South Africa, in Australia, the administrator is permitted to become 
the liquidator of the company if the creditors resolve that the company be wound 
up350. As discussed above, the role of a liquidator and practitioner are contrary roles, 
and therefore, it is submitted that the expectation to have one person play the same 
role in contrary offices is unnecessary and may lead to a conflict of interest. 
      Also common among the three countries is the requirement that the practitioner 
recommend a rescue plan for the future course of the company. In all these 
jurisdictions, creditors are given a chance to vote on the rescue plan recommended 
by the practitioner. However in the UK, administrators may seek for a court order 
where the creditors fail to approve of their recommended plans. 
4.4 Decision making 
      This is the last process of a corporate rescue procedure and is thus where the fate 
of the company is decided. It deals with persons who are ultimately able to exercise 
control-i.e. how power is allocated in each jurisdiction. 
4.4.1 South Africa 
      Within a period of 10 business days after publishing the business rescue plan, the 
practitioner has a duty to convene and preside over a meeting of creditors and any 
other holders of a voting interest, including shareholders whose rights are affected in 
order to consider the rescue plan.351 Thus before the meeting, the practitioner must 
deliver a notice of meeting to all affected persons.352  In this regard, Bradstreet has 
noted that business rescue is not only concerned with repaying creditors, but also 
with protecting all affected parties by appointing a business rescue practitioner to 
ensure that the various stake are balanced within the constraints of the legislation.353 
       At the meeting of creditors,354 the practitioner is required to introduce the 
proposed business rescue plan to the creditors, and shareholders where it is 
applicable.355 Additionally, the practitioner is required to give his opinion as to 
                                                          
350 S 446A Corporations Act. 
351 S 151(1) Companies Act 2008. 
352 S 151 (2) Companies Act 2008, the notice must set forth the agenda of the meeting and a summary 
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353 Bradstreet op cit note 3 at 355. 
354 See ss 152(1),152(2) Companies Act 2008, 




whether he or she believes that there is a reasonable prospect of the company being 
rescued.356  
      Moreover, the practitioner must also provide an opportunity for the employees’ 
representatives to address the meeting.357 It is notable that employees have a say in 
the during the rescue procedure of the company and are therefore stakeholders in the 
proceedings.358 
      During the meeting, the practitioner also conducts a vote where creditors are able 
to amend or revise the proposed rescue plan359.  In this light, creditors of a company 
are entitled to form a creditor’s committee, through which the practitioner must 
consult during the development of the business rescue plan.360 If the business rescue 
plan is approved by the prescribed majority creditors who have a voting interest, 
such plan will be final. However, the plan should not alter the rights of any class of 
shareholders and holders of the company’s securities.361 A business rescue plan that 
has been adopted is binding on the company, on each creditor of the company and 
every holder of the company’s securities362. This process compels every affected 
party to adhere to the rescue plan. 
      If the business rescue plan proposed is rejected, and no affected person has acted 
to extend the proceedings, the business rescue proceedings will come to an end.363 
4.4.2 Australia 
      During administration, there are two crucial meetings that are necessary for the 
decision making process. The first meeting is to occur within 8 days of 
administration commencement, the purpose of this meeting is to allow creditors to 
determine whether they should appoint a creditor’s committee364. This is similar to 
the position in South Africa, where there is also provision for the appointment of a 
                                                          
356 S 152(1)(b) Companies Act 2008. 
357 S 152(c) Companies Act 2008. 
358 The employees delegate their authority to their chosen employee representatives, and therefore 
they are sufficiently represented. 
359 S 152(d) Companies Act 2008. 
360 S 145(3) Companies Act 200.8 
361 S 152(3)(b), however if the rescue plan does alter the rights of the holders of any securities, the 
practitioner must hold a meeting with the holders where they will vote to approve the adoption of the 
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362 S 152(4) Companies Act 2008 the rescue plan is adopted regardless of whether the person was 
present at the meeting, voted in favour of the adoption of the plan or in the case of creditors, had 
proven their claims against the company. 
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creditor’s committee.365The committee merely acts as a middle man because it 
consults with the administrator about matters relating to administration and considers 
response reports made by the administrator. An additional purpose of this meeting is 
to remove or replace the administrator366 if there is need to do so.367 According to 
Murray & Harris, this approach gives creditors a measure of control in the 
proceedings because usually administration is commenced by the directors.368  
      At the second meeting of creditors, the future of the company is decided. In this 
meeting, the creditors consider which of three routes they want to take, namely that: 
(i)  The company execute the deed of company arrangement, 369 
(ii)  the administration should end, 370 
(iii) or the company be wound up.371  
      If creditors decide that the administration should end, the moratorium ceases to 
operate and the management of the company returns to the hands of the directors. 
Where the resolution is that the company be wound-up, the administrator then 
automatically becomes the liquidator of the company.372During the second meeting, 
the administrator must give the creditors a report regarding the company’s financial 
position and a statement indicating the administrator’s opinion as to whether it is in 
the creditor’s interests to enter into a deed of company arrangement, whether the 
company should terminate the administration or whether the company should be 
wound up.373 This enables the creditors to vote having been advised after the 
administrator’s opinion. If at the end of the meeting the creditors fail to make a 
resolution, the administration comes to an end and the management of the company 
then returns to the directors.374 
 
                                                          
365 S 145(3) Companies Act 2008. 
366 In South Africa, the business rescue practitioner may only be removed by a court order. This may 
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Companies Act 2008. 
367 Ss 139(1),130(2) Companies Act 2008. 
368 Murray & Harris op cit note173 at 651. 
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4.4.3 United Kingdom 
      In deciding on the way forward of the company, an initial meeting of creditors is 
held during which the administrator’s proposals are considered.375 The creditors may 
approve the proposals without modifications or with modifications, in which event 
the administrator has to give consent.376 Where the proposals are approved, the 
administrator is required to manage the company and its affairs in terms of any 
proposals made.377 Therefore if the proposal is approved, its terms are binding on the 
affected persons. As is the case in South Africa and Australia, a creditor’s committee 
may be appointed to play the role of a middleman as between the administrator and 
the creditors.378  
      On application of the administrator, the court may end the appointment of the 
administrator, thus ending the rescue procedure.379 Additionally, if the administrator 
thinks that the purpose of administration has been sufficiently achieved, he or she 
may file a notice to court or with the registrar of companies thus terminating the 
administration process.380 Lastly, on the application of a creditor of a company, the 
court may provide for the appointment of an administrator of the company to cease 
to have effect, therefore ending administration.381  
4.4.4 Analysis 
It is observed that the decision making process in Australia and UK is more creditor 
friendly as compared to South Africa, this is because only the interests of the 
creditors are to be considered. In South Africa, the decision making process engages 
all affected stakeholders, which includes employees, creditors and shareholders.382  
Similar among all the jurisdictions is that there is no need for a court approval for the 
implementation of the rescue plan. However in the UK, the administrator is required 
to notify the court of the decision made in the creditors meeting as whether the 
proposals are to be adopted or modified. Moreover in all three countries, the 
practitioner gives his or her opinion and the affected parties vote in favour of or 
                                                          
375 Schedule B1 paragraph 53 UK Insolvency Act. 
376 Schedule B1 paragraph 53 UK Insolvency Act. 
377 Schedule B1 paragraph 68 UK Insolvency Act. 
378 Schedule B1 paragraph 57 UK Insolvency Act. 
379 Schedule B1 paragraph 79 UK Insolvency Act. 
380 Schedule B1 paragraph 80 UK Insolvency Act. 
381 Schedule B1 paragraph 81 UK Insolvency Act. 




against the suggested plan. As an outcome, in all of these jurisdictions, if the rescue 
plan is approved, it is binding and the practitioner may not deviate from it. 
      Among all the three countries, there is a common trend of allowing the 
appointment of a creditor’s committee, which committee acts as a middleman 
between the practitioner and the creditors. In this regard, before convening the 
meeting with creditors, the practitioner must publish a notice or opinion that will 
help them make an informed decision.  
      During the process of decision making, it is notable that in South Africa, a 
secured or unsecured creditor has a voting interest equal to the value of the amount 
owed to that creditor by the company.383 In Australia, the legislation384 is silent on 
the matter of voting rights. However, the Corporations Act does not recognise that a 
holder of security over a company’s assets is entitled to greater voting rights than an 
unsecured creditor or a creditor holding inferior security.385According to Lipton, this 
may result in a creditors meeting resolving that a deed of company arrangement be 
executed by the company against the wishes of the secured creditors.386 This may 
cause the secured creditors to enforce their rights under the security, i.e. receivership, 
rather than participating in administration.387 
      Where a decision is made to terminate the corporate rescue process, the 
moratorium comes to an end and the management of the company returns back to the 
directors. 
Conclusion 
Whilst there is some common ground in each of the regimes, there are also 
differences. A discussion of all these regimes helps illustrate the fact that each 
regime though sharing similar components is tailor made to best suit the countries 
social, political and economic environment. 
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Chapter 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The judicial management regime in Botswana has proven to carry with it a number 
of shortcomings that make it an ineffective corporate rescue regime. As a regime of 
corporate reorganisation, the procedure is faulty in itself as illustrated from the 
discussion in chapter two concerning its operation in South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Australia. There is thus a need for Botswana to move towards a modern effective 
corporate rescue regime. In this regard, Godwin notes that because of the previous 
financial crisis, there has been a re-examination of corporate rescue statutes as a way 
of protecting the economy.388 Thus Botswana should re-examine its corporate rescue 
regimes, to ensure that an effective rescue mechanism is put in place to turnaround 
ailing companies and therefore protect the economy which is making an attempt 
towards growth. 
5.1 Drawbacks of judicial management in Botswana 
As indicated above in chapter three, the following are weaknesses of the judicial 
management regime in Botswana, thus warranting reform: 
 The fact that this regime is highly reliant on court process makes it expensive 
and onerous, thus being unsuitable for small companies.  In this regard, 
Kloppers has pointed out that small and medium companies play an important 
role in the economy of a developing and developed country.389 Therefore, 
such companies are worthy of corporate rescue as big companies.390 However 
the fact that the judicial management is court oriented is a drawback also 
looking at the fact that the majority of companies in Botswana are small to 
medium sized.  
 Additionally, the burden of proof required by the Botswana Companies Act, 
being that there should be a ‘reasonable probability’ that the company will 
recover is a heavy burden to proof. Having requirements that are less 
burdensome will encourage directors to opt for corporate rescue when the 
company gets into financial distress. 
 Moreover there is no requirement for there to be a rescue plan that outlines 
how the company will be turned into a profitable entity. This plan as 
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discussed above also allows the participation of various stakeholders, which 
consists of creditors and shareholders. Such key players in the company will 
thus be able to feel that they play a part in the turnaround process, if there is 
provision for a rescue plan. 
 Another pitfall is the fact that there are no set qualifications that are required 
for one to be eligible to become a judicial manager, thus the tradition of 
appointing liquidators as judicial managers. Furthermore the fact that 
liquidators are appointed as judicial managers is problematic because they are 
trained in dismantling the company and not in rescuing the company. There is 
therefore a need for set qualifications and skills which follow the position of 
the rescue practitioner. 
 The judicial management provisions further do not provide for an automatic 
moratorium. Under the Botswana Companies Act, a moratorium may only 
come into place upon the discretion of the courts, this is not mandatory or 
automatic. 
 Furthermore, the attitude of reluctance that the courts have towards judicial 
management makes it a dormant procedure. Thus the procedure is not able to 
achieve its stated aim of rescuing companies that are going through financial 
distress. The procedure is therefore creditor-friendly unlike modern corporate 
rescue regimes that are more debtor friendly, looking towards maintaining the 
company as a going concern. The courts see this procedure as a being a 
‘drastic measure’ because of the need to uphold creditor rights over debtor 
rights. 
5.2 Recommended corporate rescue regime for Botswana 
 The establishment of an efficient and effective corporate rescue mechanism presents 
challenges for all jurisdictions, this is because of several reasons which are worth 
noting: Firstly, there are many different corporate rescue models from which 
countries can choose and these require a range of issues to be considered and 
resolved. Among these factors are whether creditors should be able to initiate the 
process to whether the debtor in possession model should be adopted.391 According 





to Godwin, the choice of model is a reflection of where jurisdictions stand in relation 
to a broad range of political, social and economic issues, including the following: 392 
      Where to strike a balance between the right of debtors and the right of creditors, 
particularly secured creditors. This is true also looking at the current judicial 
management regime in Botswana, which is creditor friendly in contrast with modern 
corporate rescue, which is more debtor friendly. Furthermore, countries try to 
incorporate creditors and other interested parties in order to balance the rights 
between creditors and debtors. The issue is thus, where to strike a balance between 
the rights of creditors and debtors in a regime.  
      A further issue to consider is the extent to which the rights of stakeholders other 
than the debtors and the creditors should be taken into account and protected. Lastly, 
there is a need to consider the role of the existing management in corporate rescue 
and whether the directors should play an active part in implementing the rescue.  
5.2.1 Aims of Corporate rescue 
It is recommended that corporate rescue in Botswana should seek to satisfy two key 
aims: 
(i) to ensure that the business, property and affairs of the company are 
administered in such a way  that maximises the chances of the company 
or as much of its business as possible surviving, and, 
(ii) to get better results for creditors  than they would get if the company 
entered liquidation 
      The ultimate aim should be to ensure the viability of the company. Thus it will be 
advantageous for the economy to have a business continue, even if it is under 
different ownership. In this regard, jobs will be saved and the society at large will 
enjoy the benefits. It is further submitted that, aiming to get better results for 
creditors will ensure that the interests of creditors are considered even though there is 










As discussed above, the commencement stage is important as it is the entry route 
through which corporate rescue is initiated. 393Thus it is important that the 
commencement route should be a flexible and less cumbersome procedure. It is thus 
recommended that corporate rescue in Botswana be commenced voluntarily by the 
company’s directors. This is so because directors as controllers of the company are 
likely to know when the company is in financial distress, thus being able to initiate 
rescue at the first signs of financial distress. As is the case in South Africa, it would 
be good to include an insolvent trading provision to ensure that directors that allow 
the company to trade while insolvent without seeking the relief of corporate rescue 
be held liable.394 
       It is also submitted that receivership will not be a suitable alternative for 
Botswana. This is because the aim of corporate rescue is to rescue the debtor and 
contrary to this aim, receivership has been criticized as being more of a means for the 
recovery of the loan, regardless of the effect on a fragile business.395  Furthermore, 
company voluntary arrangements (CVA) would be of more interest as they are 
generally used for smaller countries in Australia. This will be ideal for a country like 
Botswana which has a majority of small sized companies. 
      It is recommended further that Botswana adopt a second route of commencement 
that will allow interested parties to commence corporate rescue by application to an 
independent body. Among these interested parties will be secured creditors, instead 
of having receivership that runs the risk of defeating the aim of rescuing an ailing 
company. Interested persons such as creditors, shareholders and employees will then 
have a chance to take part in the recue process. It is recommended that the court only 
play a supervisory role, in that dissatisfied interested parties be able to make an 
appeal upon rejection of application to the independent body. 
        Furthermore, it is recommended that a company be eligible for corporate rescue 
before reaching a critical stage of insolvency. Thus the company should be able to 
apply for corporate rescue at first signs of financial distress, rather than wait until the 
company is in a critical stage. Such company will have a better chance at survival 







than one that has already reached dire financial distress. Thus, a system as is 
operative in South Africa of having a company that may be insolvent in the next 
ensuing six months being eligible for corporate rescue will be a sufficient measure. 
5.2.3 Corporate Rescue Practitioner 
It is recommended that corporate rescue in Botswana commence upon the 
appointment of a corporate rescue practitioner that will oversee the affairs of the 
company whilst the company is undergoing corporate rescue. The nomination of 
such practitioner should be done by the parties that initiate the corporate rescue 
proceedings. Such practitioner should be able to take over the management of the 
company from the hands of the directors whilst allowing the directors to assist where 
such practitioner needs clarity. It is further recommended that the corporate rescue 
practitioner take over management as it will be assumed that such   practitioner will 
be trained and have the necessary skills and expertise needed to turnaround the 
company, which directors may not have. Allowing the directors to continue 
controlling the company may therefore disrupt the rescue process. In this light, it is 
recommended that the qualifications for occupying the office a corporate rescue 
practitioner be stipulated to ensure that persons with the necessary qualifications and 
skills to rescue the company from financial distress be appointed. It is necessary that 
there be an established regulatory body that will regulate persons that are eligible to 
occupy such office.  
      Furthermore, it is recommended that lawyers, accountants and business persons 
will be the best persons suited to occupy such a position, however, they should 
undergo training in order to understand the dynamics of rescuing companies. 
Although having necessary qualifications is important, it is not satisfactory, there 
should be training on how to rescue ailing companies. It is recommended that 
consultants be brought in from countries with experience in corporate rescue in order 
to train corporate rescue practitioners and regulators. Corporate rescue practitioners 
should be independent and not associated with the company in any way, in order to 








It is recommended that Botswana have an automatic moratorium in place, which is 
operative upon appointment of the corporate rescue practitioner. This will give the 
company a chance to recover without having to worry about creditor’s claims. The 
moratorium should not be at the discretion of the courts as is the case under judicial 
management. Furthermore, it is recommended that the moratorium operates against 
both secured and unsecured creditors; and that creditors should not be given 
opportunity to disrupt the rescue proceedings of a company that is already at a 
financially feeble stage. However it is recommended that there be grounds that will 
warrant the lifting of the moratorium upon leave of court, this should only be done 
under exceptional circumstances that will warrant such relief. 
       As discussed under all the three jurisdictions mentioned above,396 it is 
recommended that the moratorium not apply to criminal proceedings, so as to ensure 
that directors don’t use a procedure designed for aiding distressed companies to 
defeat the ends of justice. The moratorium should operate until the corporate rescue 
procedure comes to an end, meaning that it should continue to operate even whilst 
the rescue plan is being implemented. 
5.2.5 Rescue plan 
It is recommended further that there be a stipulated provision requiring the 
practitioner to make a rescue plan that will set out steps to be taken towards rescuing 
the company. Such plan should be approved by the creditors of the company as 
interested parties in the going concern. As is the case in South Africa it is 
recommended that voting interest on the rescue plan be according to the value of the 
amount owed to the creditor by the company.  
Conclusion 
Due to the ineffectiveness of judicial management in Botswana, this dissertation 
suggests that it is time for Botswana to change its corporate rescue regime to be in 
line with modern corporate rescue trends. Thus, the dissertation proposes a corporate 
rescue regime that will be effective in rescuing ailing companies in Botswana. Such 
corporate rescue mechanism must suit the economy of Botswana that consists mainly 
of small to medium sized companies. Furthermore, the courts should play a minimal 





role of being supervisor over this corporate rescue regime. Thus such regime should 
be a flexible and affordable one that will be able to accommodate small companies 
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